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ACCIDENTALLY ON PURPOSE: INTENT IN 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION LAW 
MARK C. WEBER* 
Abstract: American disability discrimination laws contain few intent require-
ments. Yet courts frequently demand showings of intent in disability discrimina-
tion lawsuits. Intent requirements arose almost by accident: through a false statu-
tory analogy; by repetition of obsolete judicial language; and by doctrine devel-
oped to avoid a nonexistent conflict with another law. Demanding that section 
504 and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) claimants show intent imposes 
a burden not found in those statutes or their interpretive regulations. This Article 
provides reasons not to impose intent requirements for liability or monetary relief 
in section 504 and ADA cases concerning reasonable accommodations. It demon-
strates that no intent requirement applies to ADA employment cases, then ex-
plains that the same conclusion should apply to cases under the ADA’s state and 
local government provisions and section 504. It rebuts an analogy to caselaw un-
der Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act that some courts use to impose 
intent requirements. It then discusses the reasoning of cases relying on the inap-
propriate analogy, cases resting on obsolete precedent, and cases refusing to ap-
ply remedies to avoid conflicting with federal law. This Article relies on a con-
textual reading of Supreme Court decisions, the history of the ADA, and policy 
considerations. 
INTRODUCTION 
American disability discrimination laws contain few intent requirements. 
Yet courts frequently demand showings of intent before they will remedy disa-
bility discrimination. These intent requirements have come into the law almost 
by accident: through a statutory analogy that appears apt but is in fact false; by 
continued repetition of language pulled from an obsolete judicial opinion; and 
by doctrine developed to avoid a conflict with another law when the conflict 
does not actually exist. This Article submits that many courts in disability dis-
crimination cases involving education and other governmental services have 
made these interpretive errors, wrongly requiring plaintiffs to prove intent, par-
ticularly when the cases request monetary relief. 
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The inapt statutory analogy is the borrowing of restrictive caselaw from 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,1 which forbids race discrimination by federal 
grantees, and Title IX of the Education Amendments,2 which forbids sex dis-
crimination by federal educational grantees, to interpret section 504 of the Re-
habilitation Act, which bans disability discrimination by federal grantees,3 and 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), which bans disability 
discrimination by state and local government.4 The misguided repetition of 
judicial language is the reliance on an assertion by one appellate court more 
than thirty years ago that in disability discrimination suits concerning educa-
tion, plaintiffs must prove “bad faith or gross misjudgment.”5 The unnecessary 
restriction on the reach of the disability discrimination laws to avoid contra-
dicting another law arises from a supposed conflict between section 504 and 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act6 (“IDEA”) that Congress re-
solved in 1986.7 
Demanding that disability discrimination claimants prove intent imposes 
a burden found nowhere on the face of section 504 or Title II of the ADA. It is 
true that in Alexander v. Choate, the Supreme Court required a showing of in-
tentional discrimination to establish a violation of section 504 when plaintiffs 
mounted an attack on an across-the-board state government resource allocation 
decision concerning a public welfare program.8 But the same opinion stated 
that in other kinds of cases, disparate impact—the far extreme from intent—
will suffice to establish a claim,9 and it denied the applicability of Title VI’s 
requirement of intent for damages remedies.10 Analogous cases interpreting the 
employment provisions of the ADA and Supreme Court cases interpreting oth-
er ADA provisions do not insist on proof of intentional discrimination.11 The 
text and legislative history of the ADA also show that intent is not required for 
reasonable accommodation cases.12 
                                                                                                                           
 1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2012). 
 2 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). 
 3 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). 
 4 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12165 (2012) (“ADA”). In most instances, obligations imposed by Title II 
of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are identical. See infra text accompanying notes 
88–113. 
 5 Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th Cir. 1982); see infra note 228 and accompany-
ing text (discussing additional cases). 
 6 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012) (“IDEA”). 
 7 Id. § 1415(l); see infra text accompanying notes 229–234 (discussing issue). 
 8 469 U.S. 287, 308 (1985) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 146–153). 
 9 See id. at 307 (contrasting Medicaid resource allocation decisions with discrimination in em-
ployment, education, and physical barriers to access). 
 10 Id. at 292–94. 
 11 See infra text accompanying notes 62–70 (discussing cases under ADA Title I) and 159 (Title 
II). 
 12 See infra text accompanying notes 156–158. 
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This Article spells out the reasons not to impose any intent requirement 
either for liability or for monetary relief in section 504 and ADA cases con-
cerning reasonable accommodations. It makes the uncontroversial point that no 
intent requirement applies to ADA employment cases, then explains that the 
same conclusion ought to apply to cases under the ADA’s state and local gov-
ernment services provisions and section 504. It debunks the analogy to caselaw 
under Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act that a number of courts use 
to support an intent requirement in monetary relief cases. It then identifies and 
corrects the reasoning of the cases relying on the inappropriate analogy, those 
that rest on an obsolete precedent, and those that refuse to apply a full range of 
remedies for fear of conflict with the federal special education law. 
Much of the scholarship on issues of intent in discrimination law has 
tracked judicial developments. Thus noteworthy articles commented on the 
first Supreme Court decisions expounding Title VII13 disparate impact and dis-
parate treatment theories.14 Significant commentary followed the Court’s deci-
sion in Washington v. Davis,15 which held that plaintiffs had to prove intent to 
establish a violation of equal protection.16 There was also an uptick in writing 
when Alexander v. Sandoval17 declared in 2001 that no private right of action 
existed to enforce the disparate impact regulations under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act, and so intent must be shown to make out any claim for relief under 
Title VI.18 By contrast, much recent commentary on discriminatory intent aris-
es not from Supreme Court developments but from social science advances, 
                                                                                                                           
 13 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (2012). 
 14 E.g., Robert Belton, Burdens of Pleading and Proof in Discrimination Cases, 34 VAND. L. 
REV. 1205 (1981); Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the 
Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1972); Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the 
Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title 
VII, 56 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1977). Some commentary on the disparate impact theory predated the Su-
preme Court’s cases. See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 
290–310 (1971). A belated entry into this field is Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a 
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701 (2006). 
 15 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
 16 Id. at 239; see, e.g., Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976); Alan David Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis-
crimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049 (1978); Eric 
Schnapper, Two Categories of Discriminatory Intent, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31 (1982); Pamela 
S. Karlan, Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Mens Rea: The Tortured Argument of Invidious Intent, 
93 YALE L.J. 111 (1983). 
 17 532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 18 E.g., Sam Spital, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After Alexander v. Sandoval, 19 
HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93 (2003); John Arthur Laufer, Note, Alexander v. Sandoval and Its Impli-
cations for Disparate Impact Regimes, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2002). For an illuminating discus-
sion of the interaction of Washington v. Davis and Alexander v. Sandoval, see Derek W. Black, The 
Contradiction Between Equal Protection’s Meaning and Its Legal Substance: How Deliberate Indif-
ference Can Cure It, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 568–69 (2006). 
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such as tests to discern hidden attitudes about race or other characteristics,19 
and research on popular opinion about the prevalence of discrimination.20 
Work specifically about disability discrimination displays less attention to 
issues of intent, although scholars have written thoughtful discussions about dis-
ability stereotypes and other discriminatory states of mind, and discussed how 
these attitudes both contribute to discrimination against people with disabilities 
and make it difficult to persuade triers of fact that discrimination occurred.21 
Writers have criticized the unwillingness of many courts to accept a wider range 
of disability discrimination claims based on disparate impact.22 Their work 
stresses the connection between, on the one hand, failure to accommodate, and 
on the other, maintaining practices with unjustified disparate impacts.23 
This Article seeks to break new ground by identifying, placing into context, 
and critiquing the infiltration of intent requirements into cases brought under the 
government services provisions of the disability discrimination laws.24 In recent 
                                                                                                                           
 19 E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1 (2006); Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. 
REV. 969 (2006); Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006). Chal-
lenges to the views of these scholars include Gregory Mitchell & Philip E. Tetlock, Antidiscrimination 
Law and the Perils of Mindreading, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1023 (2006). 
 20 E.g., Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2012). 
 21 E.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of 
(Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Carrie Griffin Basas, Back Rooms, Board 
Rooms: Reasonable Accommodation and Resistance Under the ADA, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
59 (2008); Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1383. 
 22 Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E. Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Ac-
tions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 864 (2006). 
 23 Id. at 887–93 (collecting sources); see also Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as 
Part and Parcel of the Antidiscrimination Project, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 861, 911 (2004) (noting common 
goal of disparate impact and reasonable accommodation prohibitions in eliminating barriers to inclu-
sion and opportunity). Professor Jolls and others have noted that both accommodation requirements 
and more traditional prohibitions on intentional discrimination in race or sex cases may diminish an 
employer’s profitability, the latter due to consumer preferences and other factors. Christine Jolls, Anti-
Discrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642, 684–97 (2001); see Bagenstos, supra 
note 21, at 837; Crossley, supra, at 889–97; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Differ-
ence: ADA Accommodation as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 597–636 (2004). 
 24 Some of this author’s earlier work described the phenomenon, but without any extensive evalu-
ation. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Procedures and Remedies Under Section 504 and the ADA for Public 
School Children with Disabilities, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 611, 627–29 (2012) 
[hereinafter, Weber, Procedures and Remedies]. The ever-astute Professor Zirkel has also observed 
that courts frequently require showings of intent in claims under section 504 in educational settings. 
See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Public School Bullying and Suicidal Behaviors, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 633, 634 
n.19 (2013); see also Christine Florick Nishimura, Note, Eliminating the Use of Restraint and Seclu-
sion Against Students with Disabilities, 16 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 189, 214–15 (2011) (“The party must 
also be able to show that the educational decisions relating to the student were inappropriate and con-
stituted either ‘bad faith’ or ‘gross misjudgment’ to make a successful special education claim under 
section 504. Furthermore, if a plaintiff is seeking monetary damages, the plaintiff must show the de-
fendants acted with deliberate indifference.” (footnotes omitted)). A prescient article by Professors 
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work, Professor Secunda presented a strong argument that the intent standard 
borrowed from Title VI is inadequate when applied to claims by students bullied 
on account of their disabilities, and he proposed the use of a reasonable accom-
modation theory and the application of a gross-mismanagement standard for 
school district liability under section 504 and Title II of the ADA.25 This Article 
concurs that the Title VI analogy is inadequate and further submits that it is le-
gally unsupportable. Moreover, this Article contends that a standard of gross 
misjudgment also lacks support in the disability discrimination statutes, and that 
liability and monetary remedies should be available for the unadorned failure to 
provide reasonable accommodation, as section 504 and the ADA clearly provide. 
Professor Black has persuasively argued for a relaxed deliberate indifference 
standard to supplant the intent requirements that courts currently apply to cases 
brought under the Equal Protection Clause; he relied in part on disability dis-
crimination precedents.26 Although application of that standard to section 504 
                                                                                                                           
Buhai and Golden analyzed caselaw as of 2000 and argued from legislative history and selected judi-
cial opinions that intent should not be required in Title II ADA damages cases. Sande Buhai & Nina 
Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 
52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121, 1121 (2000); see also Nina Golden, Compounding the Error: Deliberate 
Indifference vs. Discriminatory Animus Under Title II of the ADA, 23 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 227 (2003) 
(criticizing court of appeals decisions applying intent standards to ADA Title II). This Article builds 
on that work in part, though the argument here differs by relying as well on comparisons to the ADA’s 
employment provisions, on the fundamental premises of the reasonable accommodation duty imposed 
by the statute, and on Supreme Court cases interpreting the governmental services provisions. The 
present Article also analyzes developments since 2000, including Alexander v. Sandoval, which might 
be thought to undermine the position taken by Professors Buhai and Golden. It further seeks to identi-
fy and correct the errors in common judicial approaches to intent, particularly in cases involving edu-
cation. Another illuminating pre-Sandoval source is Leonard J. Augustine, Note, Disabling the Rela-
tionship Between Intentional Discrimination and Compensatory Damages Under Title II of the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 592, 607–12 (1998) (criticizing intent requirement 
for damages in ADA Title II accommodations cases). This author’s work from the pre-Sandoval era 
also discussed Title II and section 504 remedies. See Mark C. Weber, Disability Discrimination by 
State and Local Government: The Relationship Between Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1089, 1104–09, 1115 (1995) 
(canvassing legislative history and other sources). Helpful capsule discussions of Sandoval’s potential 
impact on ADA remedies include: SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 313–14 (2010); RUTH COLKER & PAUL D. GROSSMAN, THE LAW OF DISABILITY DIS-
CRIMINATION 159–60 (8th ed. 2013); see also MARK C. WEBER ET AL., SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 512–13 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing Sandoval and section 504 remedies in 
education cases). 
 25 Paul M. Secunda, Overcoming Deliberate Indifference: Reconsidering Effective Legal Protec-
tions for Bullied Special Education Students, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 175, 200–09. Professor Secunda 
also suggests greater use of claims under state anti-bullying legislation. Id. at 210–15. 
 26 Black, supra note 18, at 575. Professor Black’s deliberate indifference test is:  
an objective one with four prongs: first, whether the government was or should have 
been aware of the racial harm or impacts that its actions caused or the bene-
fits/opportunities it denied; second, whether other less harmful reasonable alternatives 
were or became available; third, why those alternatives were not implemented; and 
fourth, what, if any, interests are used to justify the racial harm. The inquiry moves to 
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and ADA cases might produce results in some cases similar to those produced by 
the approach suggested here, this Article finds ample support for those results in 
section 504 and the ADA reasonable accommodation law without resorting to an 
analogy to deliberate indifference as applied to equal protection. 
Part I below defines intent, as that term is used in civil rights and other 
cases, and describes how intent affects liability and remedies under Title VII 
and other anti-discrimination statutes. Part II shows how the employment pro-
visions of the ADA make use of intent both in determining liability and in as-
signing remedies, and it makes the point that intent is not required for mone-
tary relief when an employer fails to provide reasonable accommodations. Part 
III explores section 504 and the state and local government services provisions 
of the ADA, analyzing the use of intent when courts determine liability and 
remedies. With regard to remedies, it challenges the analogy to Title VI and 
Title IX caselaw, then analyzes the Supreme Court precedent that ought to con-
trol. In Part IV, the three wrong approaches to intent in Title II and section 504 
cases are explained and corrected. 
I. INTENT: CATEGORIES OF MENS REA IN CIVIL RIGHTS CASES 
Intent is important in many areas of law. In order to clarify the use of the 
concept here, it is helpful to begin with the most familiar applications of intent, 
next to consider how courts apply intent principles to liability questions in civil 
rights claims other than disability discrimination suits, and then to discuss how 
intent affects remedies in civil rights actions. 
Criminal law and tort law make responsibility hinge on categories of state 
of mind, or what is called—typically in the criminal law context—mens rea. 
These states of mind range across a spectrum of blameworthiness27 from ani-
mus (acting “purposely,” in the language of the Model Penal Code);28 to 
knowledge to a substantial certainty that the actor’s conduct will harm a victim 
and indifference to that consequence;29 to recklessness in the sense of aware-
                                                                                                                           
the third and fourth prongs only if the answers to the first two are affirmative. Under 
the final prongs, if the defendant cannot justify the choice to perpetrate a racial harm—
in spite of available alternatives—with some governmental purpose that outweighs the 
racial harm, then the deliberate indifference standard would find that equal protection 
had been denied.  
Id. 
 27 See generally Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306 (2011) 
(discussing ability of decision makers to apply Model Penal Code distinctions regarding mens rea 
consistently). 
 28 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1962). 
 29 See id. § 2.02(2)(b); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (AM. LAW INST. 1965) 
(deeming knowledge to be equivalent to intent for tort liability: “The word ‘intent’ is used . . . to de-
note that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences 
are substantially certain to result . . . .”). 
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ness of a high risk of harm and failing to undertake slight burdens to avoid it, 
thus demonstrating indifference to others’ risk;30 to negligence;31 to strict lia-
bility, which is no state of mind requirement at all. 
In discrimination and other civil rights cases, excluding disability for a 
moment, courts apply similar mental state classifications, but with some adap-
tations. Again arrayed from most blameworthy to least, they are: discriminato-
ry animus;32 other intentionality that may nonetheless lack hostility, such as 
patronizing and stereotyping;33 deliberate indifference to known deprivation of 
rights by others under one’s control;34 negligence, at least in workplace har-
assment cases;35 disparate impact without adequate justification, which will 
sustain a claim but is not actually a showing of intent;36 then strict liability, 
which is also not a showing of intent, but applies when agency law dictates 
liability for an employer-principal on the basis of an agent’s conduct, in dis-
crimination cases where agency principles govern.37  
                                                                                                                           
 30 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 2 
(AM. LAW INST. 2010). 
 31 In tort law, negligence, like strict liability, is not a true mens rea, for it is a measure of conduct 
that does not take into account the actor’s subjective mental state. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 283 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see also OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 110 (1881) (“A man may have as bad a heart as he chooses, if his conduct is within the rules.”); 
Derek W. Black, A Framework for the Next Civil Rights Act: What Tort Concepts Reveal About 
Goals, Results, and Standards, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 259, 280–82 (2008) (discussing objective stand-
ards for negligence liability); Kevin Jon Heller, The Cognitive Psychology of Mens Rea, 99 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 317, 319 (2009) (“Common Law negligence is not actually a mental state; the rea-
sonable-person standard ‘is determined and applied without reference to what the actor was thinking 
at the moment.’”) (quoting Adam Candeub, Comment, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 2071, 2075 n.24 (1994)). 
 32 E.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Co., 530 U.S. 133, 151 (2000) (discussing age-based ani-
mus). Courts treat an explicit use of race, sex, or age the same as a decision motivated by animus, 
even if the classification is imposed for paternalistic or perceived socially beneficial goals, see, e.g., 
Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (exclusion of potentially fertile females 
from some jobs), or realistic economic considerations, see, e.g., L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (sex-differentiated pension contributions). 
 33 See infra text accompanying note 39 (discussing stereotyping). 
 34 Early applications of deliberate indifference tied it to causation, specifically the causal link 
between a municipal defendant and the deprivation of the constitutional rights of the plaintiff. Later, 
however, the Court adapted that caselaw and applied it to a Title IX damages claim, establishing de-
liberate indifference as a standard of intent. See infra text accompanying notes 133–138 (discussing 
Title VI and Title IX intent requirements). 
 35 See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 789 (1998) (stating that Court has found 
employer liability for coworker harassment based on “demonstrable negligence”). See generally Da-
vid Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899 (1993) (suggesting 
courts should recognize broader category of negligent discrimination); Karlan, supra note 16, at 125–
28 (suggesting liability based on negligence for discrimination in violation of equal protection, but 
questioning extension of liability to disparate impacts). 
 36 See infra text accompanying notes 40–43. 
 37 E.g., Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 561 U.S. 411, 416–17, 422 (2011) (holding that supervisor’s act 
motivated by discriminatory animus and causing adverse employment action creates liability for em-
ployer under Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–
1424 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1417 
The intent standard in discrimination law affects both liability and reme-
dies. Liability under Title VII for employment discrimination on the basis of 
race, sex, religion, or national origin may be established by showing animus38 
or stereotyping,39 or by demonstrating a disparate impact and not being defeat-
ed by proof of business necessity.40 Disparate impacts violate regulations 
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, a statute that prohibits dis-
crimination on the basis of race, national origin, and religion in federally as-
sisted activities.41 However, a private right of action to enforce that law exists 
only for intentional discrimination.42 Disparate impact creates liability under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, but an affirmative defense exists 
for employer actions that are based on reasonable factors other than age.43 Un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1981, liability for race discrimination in making employment 
and other contracts exists only when the defendant has acted with intent.44 
Remedies for all violations of Title VII—both disparate impact violations 
and intentional ones—may include money in the form of front pay and back 
pay, as well as orders for hiring, reinstatement, promotion, and adjustments to 
seniority status.45 If the plaintiff demonstrates intentional discrimination, the 
remedies may also include compensatory and punitive damages, up to limits 
                                                                                                                           
4335 (2012), drawing comparisons to Title VII). In contrast to Staub, which relied heavily on agency 
law, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998), expressed skepti-
cism about applying agency principles for liability under Title IX of the Education Amendments. See 
infra text accompanying notes 131–143 (discussing Gebser). 
 38 The showing may be made by inference, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973), or by direct evidence, e.g., Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 200. 
 39 E.g., Price-Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250–51 (1989). 
 40 E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Other affirmative defenses may 
defeat even intentional discrimination claims. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (bona fide occupa-
tional qualification provision). 
 41 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (reasoning that Congress intended to create 
implied cause of action only under Civil Rights Act itself, and that only intentional discrimination 
constitutes violation). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84, 97 (2008). 
 44 Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982). Section 1981 pro-
vides in part: 
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in eve-
ry State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, 
and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons 
and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, 
pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.  
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012). 
 45 Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 (1976) (“[F]ederal courts are empowered to 
fashion such relief as the particular circumstances of a case may require to effect restitution, making 
whole insofar as possible the victims of racial discrimination in hiring.”); Albermarle Paper Co. v. 
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 422–23 (1975) (reversing denial of back pay award and rejecting requirement 
of showing of bad faith in disparate impact case). 
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based on the size of the employer.46 Punitive damages are available to remedy 
only the most blameworthy type of intent, i.e., when “the respondent engaged 
in a discriminatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the 
federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual.”47 If the defendant com-
mits an intentional violation of § 1981’s prohibition on race discrimination, 
relief may include compensatory and punitive damages without any limits 
based on employer size.48 
II. INTENT IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS UNDER THE ADA 
The ADA’s employment provisions in Title I of the statute are the most 
familiar parts of the law and provide a starting point for discussing intent under 
the ADA. As with other civil rights law, intent affects the ADA employment 
title’s substantive provisions as well as its remedial ones. As the discussion 
below demonstrates, liability for employers’ failure to make reasonable ac-
commodations for workers with disabilities is strict, and monetary remedies 
are broadly available for denials of reasonable accommodations.  
A. Intent in Relation to ADA Title I’s Prohibitions 
With regard to disability discrimination in employment, Title I of the ADA 
forbids much of the same discriminatory conduct as Title VII does with race and 
sex discrimination.49 As with Title VII, for some of the conduct, an intent stand-
ard may be implied, and for other conduct it is clearly not demanded. Thus, the 
ADA’s prohibition on limiting, segregating, and classifying employees and ap-
plicants in a way that impairs employment opportunities or status because of 
disability50 seems to require intent at least in the sense of knowledge that the 
conduct is occurring and indifference to the result.51 On the other hand, ADA 
Title I forbids using standards, criteria, or methods of administration that have 
the effect of employment discrimination on the basis of disability,52 a classic 
disparate impact standard, which means there is no intent requirement. A sepa-
rate disparate impact provision bans qualification standards, employment tests, 
or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual or 
                                                                                                                           
 46 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (b)(3) (2012). “Compensatory damages” in this context do not include 
back pay, interest on back pay, or similar monetary remedies; those amounts remain available and are 
not limited by the employer size-related caps of subsection (b)(3). Id. § 1981a(b)(2). 
 47 Id. § 1981a(b)(1). 
 48 See id. § 1981a(a)(1) (restricting applicability of § 1981a to when “the complaining party can-
not recover under section 1981 of this Title”). 
 49 Michael Creta, Note, The Accommodation of Last Resort: The Americans with Disabilities Act 
and Reassignments, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1693, 1698, 1700 (2014). 
 50 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) (2012). 
 51 Compare id., with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2012) (similar Title VII provision). 
 52 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(3)(A). 
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class of individuals with a disability.53 Both kinds of disparate impact claims 
may be met with a defense if the employer shows that the standard, test, selec-
tion criterion, or other practice is job-related and consistent with business neces-
sity.54 This defense section of the statute legalizes a range of conduct that might 
otherwise be barred,55 but does not alter the strict-liability, no-intent-needed 
character of the disparate impact-based liability.56 
The ADA also requires employers to make reasonable accommodations to 
known physical or mental limitations of otherwise qualified individuals with 
disabilities unless the employer demonstrates undue hardship on the operation 
of its business.57 It further bans denying employment opportunities to other-
wise qualified individuals with disabilities if the denial is based on the need to 
accommodate.58 This accommodation requirement is unlike anything found in 
Title VII.59 It represents a major innovation in anti-discrimination law,60 and is 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. § 12112(b)(6); see also id. § 12112(b)(7) (requiring that tests reflect skill, aptitude or other 
quality being tested, rather than reflect disabilities not relevant to what test purports to measure). Pro-
visions of ADA Title I concerning medical and other examinations and inquiries also lack any intent 
or negligence requirement, thus imposing strict liability. See id. § 12112(d). 
 54 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (2012). 
 55 See Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 78–79 (2002) (discussing ADA Title I de-
fenses). 
 56 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)  (Title VII provision codifying disparate impact liability, not impos-
ing intent requirement). 
 57 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A). 
 58 Id. § 12112(b)(5)(B). 
 59 This statement is perhaps a slight exaggeration. A Title VII regulation requires “reasonable 
accommodation” of religious needs of employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(c) (2015); see Trans World 
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 66 (1977). Congress, however, made clear that the ADA pro-
vision demands much more than the minimal duties described in Hardison. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, 
pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (“The Committee wishes to make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Su-
preme Court in TWA v. Hardison . . . are not applicable to this legislation.”); S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 
36 (1990) (same). As a general matter, reasonable accommodation is foreign to Title VII. See, e.g., 
Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment Discrimina-
tion Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 311 (2001) (“In 
the ADA context, by contrast [with Title VII], the overwhelming sweep of cases concern not discrim-
ination simpliciter, but a claimed failure to redistribute in the form of accommodation.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Ac-
commodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2–4 (1996). Critics of Issacharoff et al. do not claim that Title VII has 
an ADA-style accommodation mandate, but instead emphasize the similar moral imperatives behind 
both accommodation and traditional anti-discrimination, and point out that employers bear costs of 
changing policies and taking other steps to comply with mandates against race and sex discrimination. 
See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 837; Crossley, supra note 23, at 889–97; Jolls, supra note 23, at 
684, 686–87; Stein, supra note 23, at 597–636. 
 60 See Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 59, at 4–5; see also SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND 
THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (2009) (“Importantly, the statute 
takes the concept of forbidden discrimination beyond intentional and overt exclusion; it also treats as 
discrimination the failure to provide ‘reasonable accommodations’ to people with disabilities.”); Stein, 
supra note 23, at 636 (“The ADA’s accommodation mandate is an appropriate antidiscrimination 
remedy because it corrects artificial (i.e., non-inevitable and/or easily remediable) exclusion.”); Mark 
C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (2010) 
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the key adaptation needed to make an anti-discrimination mandate effective for 
people with disabilities.61 
A reasonable accommodation claim does not require any showing of dis-
criminatory intent; the liability is strict. The First Circuit made this point clear 
in Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc.,62 when it vacated a grant of 
summary judgment on a former employee’s claim that the employer should 
have provided him reasonable accommodations. Higgins, who had a hearing 
impairment, alleged that New Balance failed to put a fan near his work station 
in the factory to clear steam that damaged his hearing aid, and refused to move 
a loudspeaker that made it hard for him to understand what co-employees near 
him were saying.63 The district court granted summary judgment to the em-
ployer on the ground that there was no proof of any disability-based animus 
against the worker.64 The court of appeals vacated that judgment.65 It stressed 
that unlike some other kinds of discrimination, liability for refusal to provide 
accommodations does not require any kind of showing of intent: 
Rather, any failure to provide reasonable accommodations for a disa-
bility is necessarily “because of a disability”—the accommodations 
are only deemed reasonable (and, thus, required) if they are needed 
because of the disability—and no proof of a particularized discrimina-
tory animus is exigible. Hence, an employer who knows of a disabil-
ity yet fails to make reasonable accommodations violates the statute, 
no matter what its intent, unless it can show that the proposed ac-
commodations would create undue hardship for its business.66 
Other authorities are in accord.67 Not surprisingly, the sole Supreme Court 
ADA case on reasonable accommodations in employment, U.S. Airways, Inc. 
                                                                                                                           
(“This accommodation duty is the defining characteristic of modern disability discrimination stat-
utes.”). 
 61 See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397 (2002) (“By definition any special ‘ac-
commodation’ requires the employer to treat an employee with a disability differently, i.e., preferen-
tially. And the fact that the difference in treatment violates an employer’s disability-neutral rule can-
not by itself place the accommodation beyond the Act’s potential reach. Were that not so, the ‘reason-
able accommodation’ provision could not accomplish its intended objective.”). 
 62 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 63 Id. at 257–58. 
 64 Id. at 263. 
 65 Id. at 265. 
 66 Id. at 264 (citation omitted). 
 67 E.g., Lenker v. Methodist Hosp., 210 F.3d 792, 799 (7th Cir. 2002) (“[I]f the plaintiff demon-
strated that the employer should have reasonably accommodated the plaintiff’s disability and did not, 
the employer has discriminated under the ADA and is liable.”); Scalera v. Electrograph Sys., Inc., 848 
F. Supp. 2d 352, 362 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[T]here is no burden on Plaintiff to show that her disability 
played any motivating role in Electrograph’s failure to provide the requested accommodation.”); see 
Jacqueline Rau, No Fault Discrimination?, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 264–65 (2012) (“The 
ADA . . . focuses on reasonable accommodation without discussion of the intent of the employer.”); 
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v. Barnett,68 does not include a single word about intent or any other mental 
state of the employer, even as it remanded for further proceedings a worker’s 
claim that U.S. Airways failed to provide the accommodation of keeping him 
in a less physically demanding position after he became disabled due to a back 
injury.69 The courts of appeals have roundly held that because plaintiffs need 
not show intent to make out a violation of the reasonable accommodation duty, 
courts in accommodations cases should not apply the burden-shifting frame-
work used for Title VII intentional discrimination claims.70 
The law on which the ADA was based, section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act of 1973,71 has interpretive regulations that establish employment rights 
and obligations similar to those in Title I of the ADA for the federal grantees to 
which it applies.72 Hence section 504’s intent requirements regarding employ-
ment and the absence of any intent requirement as to reasonable accommoda-
tion violations match ADA Title I.73 
                                                                                                                           
Bryan Joggerst, Note, Reasonable Accommodation of Mixed Motive Claims Under the ADA, 35 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1587, 1589 (2014) (“Under the ADA, even when the employer acts with no dis-
criminatory intent, it is nonetheless liable if a ‘reasonable accommodation’ of the employee’s disabil-
ity was possible but not adopted.”). 
 68 Barnett, 535 U.S. 391. 
 69 Id. at 406. The Court held that the accommodation might be reasonable even though it would 
violate an established seniority system, but said ordinarily such an accommodation would fail the 
reasonableness test. Id. at 403–05. 
 70 Lenker, 210 F.3d at 799 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)) 
(“[W]hen a plaintiff brings a claim under the reasonable accommodation part of the ADA, the burden 
shifting method of proof [defined in McDonnell Douglas] is both unnecessary and inappropriate.”); 
Higgins, 194 F.3d at 264 (stating that since reasonable accommodation does not require an employer’s 
action be motivated by discriminatory animus directed at disability, “[i]t follows inexorably that the 
McDonnell Douglas scheme is inapposite in respect to such claims”); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 
F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Aka’s reasonable accommodation claim . . . is not sub-
ject to analysis under McDonnell-Douglas . . . .”); Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 
1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996) (“If it is true that FWCS should have reasonably accommodated 
Bultemeyer’s disability and did not, FWCS has discriminated against him. There is no need for indi-
rect proof or burden shifting.”); see Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Dif-
ference, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 98, 152 (1997) (“[I]n a claim based on a failure to reasona-
bly accommodate . . . [t]he purpose of the plaintiff’s prima facie case . . . is not to raise a rebuttable 
presumption of discriminatory intent. Instead, the ‘elusive factual question’ to be determined is 
whether the employer complied with its statutory obligation to provide reasonable accommodation.”). 
 71 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012). As noted above, this law forbids disability discrimination by recipients 
of federal financial assistance and by federal government agencies. 
 72 29 C.F.R. §§ 32.12–.17 (2015). 
 73 E.g., Nadler v. Harvey, No. 06-12692, 2007 WL 2404705, at *8 (11th Cir. Aug. 24, 2007) 
(unpublished) (in employment discrimination action against Postal Service under section 504, stating 
that for “reasonable accommodation cases . . . there is no need to prove discriminatory motivation”); 
Peebles v. Potter, 354 F.3d 761, 766 (8th Cir. 2004) (in action for employment discrimination under 
section 504 stating, “[A] claim against an employer for failing to reasonably accommodate a disabled 
employee does not turn on the employer’s intent or actual motive”). 
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B. Intent in Relation to Remedies Under ADA Title I 
Although Title I provides for liability without intent or any other mens rea 
in disparate impact and reasonable accommodation cases, the availability of 
some relief in ADA employment cases turns on the state of mind of the de-
fendant. In cases of unlawful intentional discrimination, as well in those of 
violations of the reasonable accommodation provisions, the law permits com-
pensatory and punitive damages, within limits based on the size of the employ-
er.74 It also allows Title VII-style equitable remedies that include back and 
front pay, hiring, reinstatement, and so on.75 
There is, however, a limited affirmative defense with respect to compen-
satory damages in reasonable accommodation cases. Damages may not be 
awarded for denials of reasonable accommodation when the employer or other 
covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person 
with a disability who informed the entity that the accommodation was needed, 
to identify and make a reasonable accommodation.76 Other monetary remedies 
such as back and front pay remain available, along with injunctive relief; the 
remedies when the affirmative defense applies are thus the same as those for 
disparate impact disability discrimination.77 
Like Title VII, ADA Title I conditions punitive damages on the defend-
ant’s state of mind. Punitive damages are permitted when the complaining par-
ty demonstrates that the respondent engaged in a discriminatory practice with 
                                                                                                                           
 74 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(2) (2012). Section 1981a provides remedies in employment discrimina-
tion actions. It states: 
In an action brought by a complaining party under the powers, remedies, and proce-
dures set forth in section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (as provided in sec-
tion 107(a) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(a)), and 
section 794a(a)(1) of Title 29, respectively) against a respondent who engaged in un-
lawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because 
of its disparate impact) under section 791 of Title 29 and the regulations implementing 
section 791 of Title 29, or who violated the requirements of section 791 of Title 29 or 
the regulations implementing section 791 of Title 29 concerning the provision of a rea-
sonable accommodation, or section 102 of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
or committed a violation of section 102(b)(5) of the Act, against an individual, the 
complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive damages as allowed in sub-
section (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section 706(g) of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.  
Id. The language thus applies to employment discrimination cases brought under Title II of the ADA 
and section 504. The statute does not impose any intent requirement for reasonable accommodation 
cases, and it provides the same remedies in those cases as it does in intentional discrimination cases. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. § 1981a(a)(3). 
 77 See id. § 1981a(a)(2). 
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malice or reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved 
individual.78 
With regard to ADA employment cases, the law thus creates a hierarchy 
of intent and corresponding remedies, with malice and reckless indifference at 
the top, then ordinary intent, then denial of reasonable accommodation without 
any showing as to state of mind, then disparate impact, then denial of reasona-
ble accommodation with a demonstration of good faith effort by the defendant. 
Notably, everything that is a violation at all merits some monetary remedy 
such as back pay, as well as the whole range of injunctive remedies, the same 
as Title VII. 
Courts have applied the intent-related remedy provisions of Title I in a 
straightforward manner. For example, in Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission v. Autozone, Inc.,79 the Seventh Circuit upheld a jury award of 
back pay and compensatory and punitive damages in a case alleging that the 
employer failed to accommodate a car parts sales manager, whose back condi-
tion left him unable to mop floors, by refusing to shift that part of his job re-
sponsibilities.80 On appeal, no defense was raised concerning good faith efforts 
to achieve an accommodation in consultation with the employee.81 The court 
upheld the compensatory damages award, holding that the damages were not 
excessive in comparison to other cases or the magnitude of plaintiff’s suffer-
ing.82 The court upheld the punitive damages award as well, ruling that a rea-
sonable jury could have found that Autozone acted with reckless indifference 
to the employee’s rights. The court noted that the supervisors who refused to 
adjust the worker’s job responsibilities had all received ADA training, and that 
Autozone failed to follow its own established procedures for dealing with the 
worker’s accommodation request.83 
The remedial hierarchy of Title I and its relation to intent make sense. 
Having back pay and injunctive remedies available for disparate impact disa-
bility discrimination gives meaningful relief to those plaintiffs who are the in-
advertent victims of forbidden employment decisions.84 The enhanced reme-
dies for intentional discrimination and denial of reasonable accommodations—
                                                                                                                           
 78 Id. § 1981a(b)(1). 
 79 707 F.3d 824, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2013). 
 80 Id. at 829. 
 81 Id. at 837–38. 
 82 Id. at 832–33. 
 83 Id. at 835–36. 
 84 See Mijha Butcher, Using Mediation to Remedy Civil Rights Violations When the Defendant Is 
Not an Intentional Perpetrator, 24 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 225, 246 (2003) (“The ADA encom-
passes a type of discrimination that has been branded as wrongful, insofar as it is unreasonable for 
certain employment decisions to be predicated on such grounds, yet the courts and the public believe 
that well-intentioned people may at times make decisions based on illicit criteria. When they do, no 
public shamings attach, the defendant is simply asked to rectify the wrong.”). 
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payment for pain and suffering or other emotional distress and consequential 
damages—provide fuller make-whole relief to the plaintiff and reinforce the 
moral opprobrium that should attach to that conduct, even in the absence of 
animus.85 These remedies also allow for the greater likelihood that emotional 
injury will occur when the violation is intentional or is the denial of an ac-
commodation rather than wholly incidental conduct that harms the disabled 
employee. When animus is present, the blame should be much greater, so the 
statute makes punitive remedies available.86 
The range of remedies under Title I that do not need a showing of intent 
does not just correspond to society’s moral sense; it also takes into account the 
troublesome reality of proving intentional discrimination. Speaking of discrim-
ination remedies in general, Professor Stone observed, “As with a tort plaintiff 
invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, an employment discrimination plain-
tiff is not ideally situated to procure the evidence that she will need to demon-
strate another person’s motivation or state of mind at the time that a given de-
cision was made.”87 Plaintiffs unable to show more than a disparate impact 
receive some relief, both monetary and injunctive, but less than those proving 
intentional discrimination or denial of a reasonable accommodation. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 25 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 718. The 
House Report notes: 
Victims of intentional sexual or religious discrimination in employment terms and con-
ditions often endure terrible humiliation, pain and suffering. This distress often mani-
fests itself in emotional disorders and medical problems. Victims of discrimination of-
ten suffer substantial out-of-pocket expenses as a result of the discrimination, none of 
which is compensable with equitable remedies. The limitation of relief under Title VII 
to equitable remedies often means that victims of intentional discrimination may not re-
cover for the very real effects of the discrimination. Thus, victims of intentional dis-
crimination are discouraged from seeking to vindicate their civil rights.  
Id. 
 86 See Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 538 (1999) (“Conduct warranting punitive 
awards has been characterized as ‘egregious,’ for example, because of the defendant’s mental state.”); 
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1779 
(2012) (“Our legal system judges the entitlement to some form of action against the defendant in light 
of what the defendant did to the plaintiff. In particular, it judges that the scope of the response entitle-
ment may reach beyond the self-restorative to the injury-inflicting where the underlying wrong was 
itself a willful or wanton infliction of injury.”); see also CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON 
THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 79 (1935) (discussing requirement of “real and not fictitious ill will”). 
 87 Kerri Lynn Stone, Shortcuts in Employment Discrimination Law, 56 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 
142, 157 (2011). The inference established for Title VII cases under McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 
802, discussed supra text accompanying note 70, compensates in part for the difficulties in proving 
the defendant’s intent, but a more efficient solution is dispensing with an intent requirement altogeth-
er, albeit in exchange for a reduced set of remedies. See Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Look-
ing Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 964 (2005) (“One obvious possibil-
ity . . . is that disparate impact is merely a technique to reach defendants who are acting with discrimi-
natory intent when proof sufficient to establish a disparate treatment case is lacking.”). 
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III. INTENT IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES CLAIMS UNDER ADA TITLE II AND 
CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 504 
Though there may be isolated problems with courts improperly imposing 
intent requirements in ADA Title I cases, the intent issue in Title I is not con-
troversial. To clarify intent issues in ADA Title II and section 504 cases, the 
areas of disability discrimination law where they are controversial, it is helpful 
to separate the specific obligations that the laws impose from the remedies that 
apply when individuals are harmed because those obligations have not been 
met. Intent plays a role in both halves of the analysis. 
A. Intent and ADA Title II and Section 504 Prohibitions 
ADA Title II bars all state and local government entities from excluding 
qualified individuals with disabilities from participation in the entity’s ser-
vices, programs, and activities, and from denying qualified individuals with 
disabilities the benefits of the entity’s services, programs, or activities; the 
statute also bans subjecting qualified individuals with disabilities to discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability.88 The text does not define discrimination fur-
ther, but provides that the Attorney General shall promulgate regulations con-
sistent with the regulations originally devised by the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare covering recipients of federal financial assistance under 
section 504.89 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 forbids the same 
discriminatory conduct as Title II, on the part of any program or activity re-
ceiving federal financial assistance, as well as United States executive agencies 
and the Postal Service, and it delegates authority to promulgate regulations to 
heads of each agency.90 The definitions section incorporates the ADA’s defini-
tion of disability91 and individual with a disability.92 
The Attorney General’s ADA Title II regulations repeat the statute’s gen-
eral prohibition on discrimination,93 and elaborate on it by outlawing actions 
that on the basis of disability: deny qualified individuals with disabilities the 
opportunity to participate in or benefit from a government aid, benefit or ser-
vice; afford an opportunity to participate or benefit that is not equal to that af-
forded others; or provide an aid, benefit, or service that is not as effective in 
affording equal opportunity to obtain the same result, gain the same benefit, or 
                                                                                                                           
 88 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2012). 
 89 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a)–(b) (2012). Program accessibility, accessibility of existing facilities, and 
communications are excepted; for these topics the regulations are to be consistent with other, similar 
Department of Justice section 504 regulations. Id. § 12134(b). 
 90 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2012). Section 504 includes the language “solely by reason of her or his 
disability.” The ADA omits “solely.” 
 91 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2012). 
 92 Id. § 705(20)(B). 
 93 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(a) (2015). 
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reach the same level of achievement as that provided others.94 The regulations 
also make it illegal to provide different or separate aids, benefits, or services 
unless necessary to make them as effective as those provided others, and to 
limit a qualified individual with a disability in the enjoyment of any right, priv-
ilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others.95 
The portion of the regulations just described covers intentional conduct 
that violates Title II. But the regulations also interpret Title II to forbid actions 
that simply have discriminatory effects, rather than discriminatory intent: 
A public entity may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administra-
tion that have the effect of subjecting qualified individuals with dis-
abilities to discrimination on the basis of disability or have the pur-
pose or effect of defeating or substantially impairing accomplish-
ment of the objectives of the public entity’s program with respect to 
individuals with disabilities.96 
Various courts have upheld claims based on this provision without requir-
ing any allegation or showing of intent.97 Even some courts that have ruled 
against various disparate impact claims on the merits have not rejected the 
claims for want of a showing of intent.98 
The regulations further interpret Title II to require reasonable modifica-
tions—the equivalent of reasonable accommodations in Title I— again without 
imposing any obligation on plaintiffs to prove intentional discrimination: “A 
                                                                                                                           
 94 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(i)–(iii). 
 95 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(iv)–(vii). 
 96 Id. § 35.130(b)(3) (emphasis added). The same rule applies to site selection, contracting, and 
licensing. Id. § 35.130(b)(4)–(6). The regulations also bar imposing eligibility criteria that tend to 
screen out an individual with a disability or any class of individuals with disabilities from fully and 
equally enjoying any service, program, or activity unless such criteria are shown to be necessary for 
the provision of the service, program, or activity being offered. Id. § 35.130(b)(8). 
 97 See, e.g., United States v. City of New Orleans, No. 12-2011, 2013 WL 1767787, at *6–7 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 24, 2013) (denying motion to dismiss in case alleging violations of Title II by financing mor-
atorium that included housing for people with disabilities; noting that moratorium was facially neutral 
policy with allegedly greater effect on low income people with disabilities); cf. Smith v. Henderson, 
982 F. Supp. 2d 32, 46 (D.D.C. 2013) (dismissing disparate impact claim in action challenging closing 
of under-enrolled public schools when plaintiffs did not allege failure to provide meaningful benefit). 
 98 See Tsombanidis v. W. Haven Fire Dep’t, 352 F.3d 565, 575 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that for 
disparate impact claim, “plaintiff need not show the defendant’s action was based on any discrimina-
tory intent,” but ruling that plaintiffs failed to establish disparate impact when defendant applied fire 
code to forbid planned group home); Grider v. City & County of Denver, No. 10-CV-00722, 2012 
WL 1079466, at *2–3 (D. Colo. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs did not allege facts showing 
prohibition on pit bulls had disparate impact, but stating that disparate impact claims do not require 
examination of subjective intent); Abrahams v. MTA Long Island Bus, No. 10-CV-1535, 2010 WL 
2134288, at *5–6 (E.D.N.Y. May 25, 2010) (in action over paratransit cutbacks, stating that plaintiffs 
need not show intent for disparate impact claim, but dismissing claim for failure to allege neutral 
practice that resulted in discrimination, when remaining service met ADA standards), aff’d, 644 F.3d 
110 (2d Cir. 2011). 
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public entity shall make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or pro-
cedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the 
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or 
activity.”99 Title II itself provides guidance on the meaning of reasonable mod-
ifications by defining a qualified individual with a disability as one “who with 
or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal 
of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or provision of aux-
iliary aids or services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the re-
ceipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a 
public entity.”100 The courts that have read the law carefully have not found an 
intent requirement in Title II reasonable modification cases,101 though the rec-
ord is mixed, as discussed in greater detail below.102 
Closely aligned with the reasonable modification provision is the re-
quirement that state and local governmental services must be provided in the 
most integrated setting appropriate.103 Reasonable modifications to policies, 
practices, or procedures are often needed for people to be served in less restric-
tive settings, a fact demonstrated by the leading ADA Title II case on the topic, 
Olmstead v. L.C.104 In Olmstead, the Supreme Court held that the ADA may 
require placement of individuals with mental disabilities in community settings 
rather than institutions. The court cited both the most-integrated-setting and the 
reasonable modification regulations in concluding that Georgia needed to alter 
its practices in delivering mental health services to permit people with mental 
impairments who can be treated in the community to be placed there.105 
Like the reasonable modification regulation, the integration regulation 
does not demand a showing of intent in order to make a claim; the Olmstead 
opinion did not rely on any finding of animus, deliberate indifference, or any 
other mental state on the part of the government. Helen L. v. DiDario,106 a 
                                                                                                                           
 99 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7). The fundamental alteration defense in the Title II regulation corre-
sponds to the undue hardship defense in ADA Title I. 
 100 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2012); see Weber, supra note 60, at 1168 (comparing reasonable ac-
commodation duty in ADA employment cases and reasonable modification duty in ADA state and 
local government cases). 
 101 E.g., Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 1995) (discussed infra text accompanying 
notes 106–107); Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 119 F. Supp. 2d 181, 206–07 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (in reasona-
ble modification case regarding services for individuals with HIV, holding that government’s motive 
or intent is irrelevant), aff’d sub nom. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 102 See infra text accompanying notes 159–167, 192–204 (collecting reasonable modification 
cases). 
 103 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs, and activities in 
the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”). 
 104 527 U.S. 581, 606–07 (1999) (plurality opinion). 
 105 Id. at 592. 
 106 Helen L., 46 F.3d 325. 
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Third Circuit decision that foreshadowed Olmstead, made the point explicit 
when it upheld the ADA claim of a woman maintained by the state Department 
of Public Welfare in a nursing home even though she could have been accom-
modated with in-home services: 
Because the ADA evolved from an attempt to remedy the effects of 
“benign neglect” resulting from the “invisibility” of the disabled, 
Congress could not have intended to limit the Act’s protections and 
prohibitions to circumstances involving deliberate discrimination. 
Such discrimination arises from “affirmative animus” which was not 
the focus of the ADA or section 504.107 
The section 504 regulations on which the Title II regulations are based al-
so contain prohibitions on denying qualified individuals the opportunity to par-
ticipate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service; denying an opportunity 
to participate or benefit that is not equal to that afforded others; providing any 
aid, benefit, service or training that is not as effective as that provided others; 
providing different aids, benefits, services or training unless necessary to be 
effective; and limiting a qualified individual in the enjoyment of any right, 
privilege, advantage, or opportunity enjoyed by others.108 There is a prohibi-
tion on disparate impact discrimination and a requirement that programs and 
activities be administered in the most integrated setting appropriate.109 Rea-
sonable accommodations are addressed in the regulations pertaining to em-
ployment110 and program accessibility,111 and are covered as well in regula-
tions of specific agencies pertaining to their employees and grantees.112 
These disparate impact, reasonable modifications, and integrated services 
regulations implementing the ADA government services title and section 504 
are based on the recognition that for persons with disabilities, what discrimi-
nates against them, what Congress was trying to change, is government activi-
ty and inactivity that prevents them from achieving equality in the enjoyment 
of public spaces, public schools, public health services, public transportation, 
and the wealth of programs and facilities that modern government furnishes its 
citizens. That harm is no less real for being heedless. Applying an intent stand-
                                                                                                                           
 107 Id. at 335. 
 108 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(b)(1) (2015). 
 109 Id. § 41.51(b)(3), (d). 
 110 28 C.F.R. § 41.53 (2015). 
 111 28 C.F.R. § 39.150(a) (2015) (incorporating fundamental alteration limit, imposing burden on 
covered entity). 
 112 See, e.g., 34 C.F.R. § 104.12 (2015) (requiring reasonable accommodation of employees of 
grantees of Department of Education); id. § 104.44 (requiring academic adjustments for students in 
programs of grantees engaged in higher education). Even more specific modification duties apply to 
programs that provide preschool, elementary, and secondary education. See id. §§ 104.32–.39. 
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ard would prevent the disability discrimination law from achieving its most 
basic goals. 
In general, the combination of the statutory provisions and regulations for 
state and local government programs under ADA Title II and federally assisted 
activities under section 504 mirrors that of ADA Title I regarding disability 
discrimination in employment.113 The differences are that the specifics with 
regard to modifications and disparate impact are found in the regulations rather 
than in the statute itself, and non-employment cases lack a detailed remedies 
provision such as the one that applies to ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. 
B. Intent and Remedies Under Title II and Section 504 
Remedies—in the broad sense of what violations of the law individuals 
may present to courts and the narrower one of what a court should do to grant 
relief for a violation—are where things become more complex. Because the 
remedies under ADA Title II and section 504 are those of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act,114 many courts have looked to the caselaw regarding non-intentional 
race and sex discrimination under Title VI and Title IX of the Education 
Amendments115 in deciding ADA Title II and section 504 remedies questions. 
For reasons explained below, this comparison is misguided. The Supreme 
Court’s definitive interpretation of non-intentional disability discrimination un-
der section 504 provides the approach that ought to control, the one that Con-
gress ratified when it enacted ADA Title II. The source for additional guidance is 
not a wooden reading of the Title VI caselaw, but rather the Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in interpreting remedies under ADA Title II in the one case that con-
sidered the issue.  
1. Title VI and Title IX Cases and Related Remedies Developments for 
Non-Intentional Race and Sex Discrimination 
Early caselaw under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act permitted actions to 
proceed on allegations of disparate impact on the basis of race and national 
                                                                                                                           
 113 This conclusion should be unremarkable, for Title II and section 504 cover employment as 
well as other activities of the entities covered by the two statutes. 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(a) (2015). Em-
ployees of government or federally assisted enterprises with fewer than fifteen employees will be 
covered only by Title II or section 504, and not by Title I, because of the latter’s employer-size re-
strictions. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2012). Some courts, however, have held Title II inapplicable to 
employment despite explicit coverage in the Title II regulations and legislative history support. See 
Brumfeld v. City of Chicago, 735 F.3d 619, 624–31 (7th Cir. 2013) (collecting authorities). Contra 
Bledsoe v. Palm Beach Conservation Dist., 133 F.3d 816, 821–23 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 114 See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2012) (incorporating “remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in 
section 794a of title 29” for violations of ADA Title II); 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (2012) (incorporating 
“remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964” for violations of 
section 504). 
 115 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2012). The wording of Title VI and Title IX is identical. 
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origin, although judges often relied on the Title VI regulations rather than the 
statute itself. The Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Lau v. Nichols exempli-
fied this approach in upholding a claim based on San Francisco’s failure to 
afford meaningful educational services to students who spoke only Chinese.116 
Nevertheless, several years later, apparently to avoid a conflict in which the 
Equal Protection Clause might permit a race-conscious affirmative action pro-
gram while Title VI forbade it, the Supreme Court declared that Title VI’s pro-
hibition on race discrimination was no broader than that of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.117 The Court in Washington v. Davis had held that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause did not bar disparate impacts,118 and in the context of a sex dis-
crimination case, Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, the Court said that the 
discrimination the Equal Protection Clause outlawed was negative treatment 
undertaken because of, rather than despite, its effect on women.119 
This interpretation imposed a requirement of animus.120 The provisions 
challenged in the equal protection cases were purposeful discrimination in the 
sense that Massachusetts officials in Feeney knew that the veteran’s preference 
had a negative effect on women but kept it anyway,121 just as the District of 
Columbia in Davis certainly knew that its employment test had a negative ef-
fect on African-Americans and kept it anyway.122 But the Court found no lia-
bility for that sort of intent. What mattered to the Court was that there was no 
showing of actual hostility on the basis of sex or race in those equal protection 
challenges. 
                                                                                                                           
 116 414 U.S. 563 (1974). 
 117 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (“In view of the clear legisla-
tive intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the 
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.”); id. at 328 (joint op. of Brennan, White, Marshall, 
& Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The threshold question we must decide is 
whether Title VI . . . bars recipients of federal funds from giving preferential consideration to disad-
vantaged members of racial minorities . . . . In our view, Title VI prohibits only those uses of racial 
criteria that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment if employed by a State or its agencies.”). 
 118 426 U.S. 229, 239–40 (1976); see Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 
252, 264–65 (1977) (“Our decision last Term in Washington v. Davis made it clear that official action 
will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact.”). 
 119 442 U.S. 256, 276 (1979) (“The dispositive question, then, is whether the appellee has shown 
that a gender-based discriminatory purpose has, at least in some measure, shaped the Massachusetts 
veterans’ preference legislation.”). The Court limited its analysis to statutes that are facially gender-
neutral. Id. at 274. 
 120 See id. (“[T]he . . . question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based dis-
crimination.”). 
 121 See id. at 278–79 (“[I]t cannot seriously be argued that the Legislature of Massachusetts could 
have been unaware that most veterans are men. It would thus be disingenuous to say that the adverse 
consequences of this legislation for women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional 
or in the sense that they were not foreseeable. ‘Discriminatory purpose,’ however, implies more than 
intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences.”). 
 122 The city defended its practice on the basis of Title VII standards, which permit disparate im-
pacts supported by business necessity. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 238 n.8. 
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Then in 1983, in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission,123 a Title 
VI case alleging a disparate racial impact in employment, the Supreme Court 
formed conflicting majorities for two propositions. First, discriminatory intent 
would not be required to establish liability—three justices said that the Title VI 
regulations validly embodied a disparate impact standard and two said that 
discriminatory animus is not an essential element of a violation of Title VI it-
self.124 But second, without proof of discriminatory animus, compensatory re-
lief should not be ordered; unless discriminatory intent is shown, declaratory 
and limited injunctive relief should be the only private remedies for Title VI 
violations.125 The basis for the second proposition also reflected a split among 
the justices, with two saying that make-whole remedies are not ordinarily ap-
propriate in private actions for violations of spending clause statutes, but an 
exception should be made in instances of intentional discrimination;126 two 
saying that private relief should never be granted under Title VI;127 and one 
saying that the regulations imposing a disparate impact standard were not val-
id, but monetary relief for conduct violating Title VI itself, that is, intentional 
conduct only, is permitted.128 There was no conflict with Lau, because the 
plaintiffs there did not demand monetary relief.129 The Court did not elaborate 
on what nature or degree of intent would be needed to support a monetary 
remedy; however, disparate impact did not suffice.130 
Next in sequence, the Court decided Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District131 and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,132 holding 
that to sustain damages actions under Title IX against school districts for teacher 
and peer sex harassment, the plaintiff had to show deliberate indifference by a 
                                                                                                                           
 123 463 U.S. 582, 584 (1983). 
 124 Id. at 607. 
 125 Id. at 607 n.2. 
 126 Id. at 597–603. 
 127 Id. at 608 (Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., concurring in judgment). 
 128 Id. at 612–13 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
 129 See Lau, 414 U.S. at 564 (“No specific remedy is urged upon us.”). 
 130 In 1979, the Supreme Court recognized an implied cause of action, apparently for both injunc-
tive relief and damages, under Title IX in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 709 (1979), 
and the Court’s holding extended readily to Title VI and section 504, as demonstrated by Guardians 
Ass’n, 463 U.S. 582, and Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985). 
 131 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (“We conclude that damages may not be recovered in those circum-
stances unless an official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to institute corrective 
measures on the district’s behalf has actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s 
misconduct.”). 
 132 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) (“We thus conclude that funding recipients are properly held liable 
in damages only where they are deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which they have 
actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive 
the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”). 
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responsible official to a known deprivation of equal educational opportunity.133 
This standard strongly resembles the knowledge-indifference standard in crimi-
nal law and intentional tort law;134 it appears to be distinct from and lower in 
blameworthiness than animus, though higher than negligence or strict liability. 
The Court in Davis v. Monroe County linked the use of the deliberate in-
difference standard to the intent requirement, citing Guardians Ass’n’s lead 
opinion135 for the proposition that although Title VI funding recipients must 
have notice of potential damages liability for damages to be appropriate, “this 
limitation on private damages actions is not a bar to liability where a funding 
recipient intentionally violates the statute.”136 The Court also linked deliberate 
indifference to causation, saying that the deliberate indifference standard elim-
inates the risk that a recipient would be liable in damages not for an official 
decision but for its employees’ independent actions, citing and quoting 
Gebser.137 Davis v. Monroe County states that “Gebser thus established that a 
recipient intentionally violates Title IX, and is subject to a private damages 
action, where the recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of teacher-
student discrimination.”138 Title IX differs from Title VII, which allows com-
pany liability for intentional discrimination on the basis of employee actions, 
applying agency law.139 According to Davis v. Monroe County, “in Gebser we 
expressly rejected the use of agency principles in the Title IX context.”140 
The Gebser Court said it would “frustrate the purposes of Title IX to 
permit a damages recovery against a school district for a teacher’s sexual har-
assment of a student based on principles of respondeat superior or constructive 
notice.”141 The Court stressed that when Title IX was enacted in 1972, even 
Title VII permitted only equitable relief, and that § 1981a limited the amount 
of damages recoverable in any individual case when it expanded Title VII’s 
remedies in 1991.142 The Court said that “whereas Title VII aims centrally to 
compensate victims of discrimination, Title IX focuses more on ‘protecting’ 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Id. The standard was drawn from cases such as Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), 
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989), and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 
(1994). 
 134 See supra text accompanying note 29 (describing knowledge-indifference standard in criminal 
and tort law). 
 135 See Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. at 640 (citing Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 597–98). 
The Court also relied on Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Davis v. 
Monroe County, 526 U.S. at 639–40. 
 136 Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. at 642. 
 137 Id. (referring to Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91). 
 138 Id. at 643. 
 139 See, e.g., Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998) (applying principles of agency 
law to liability of employer in Title VII sex harassment case). 
 140 Davis v. Monroe County, 526 U.S. at 643. 
 141 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285. 
 142 Id. at 285–86. Title VII did of course permit monetary awards in the form of back pay as equi-
table remedies before 1991. Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 415 (1975). 
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individuals from discriminatory practices carried out by recipients of federal 
funds.”143 
In a culmination of its Title VI and Title IX holdings, in 2001, the Court 
decided Alexander v. Sandoval, ruling that no private litigant could assert a 
disparate impact claim under Title VI or its regulations because Title VI covers 
only intentional discrimination, and there is no private right of action to en-
force the regulations promulgated under it, the provisions that prohibit dispar-
ate impact.144 The Court relied heavily on the statements about Title VI’s scope 
in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.145 Therefore no Title VI 
case, and likely no Title IX case, may be brought by a private litigant for any-
thing but intentional discrimination, even if the case is solely for injunctive and 
declaratory relief. Sandoval did little to define the content of the intent stand-
ard. Nevertheless, if the analogy is drawn to Davis v. Monroe County and 
Gebser, deliberate indifference to known discriminatory conduct suffices, but 
disparate impact and respondeat superior do not. 
2. Non-Intentional Discrimination Under ADA Title II and Section 504 
These cases might seem to affect disability discrimination law, but in fact 
they do not. The controlling precedent is quite different. In 1985, the Supreme 
Court decided Alexander v. Choate, declaring that Congress in section 504 
perceived discrimination against people with disabilities “to be most often the 
product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness—of benign ne-
glect,” and “much of the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the 
Rehabilitation Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act 
construed to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.”146 The 
Court cited architectural barriers, transportation, special education, and reha-
bilitation services as areas where that would be the case.147 The Court conclud-
ed that it would “assume without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some 
conduct that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon the handicapped.”148 
                                                                                                                           
 143 Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287. 
 144 532 U.S. 275, 279–93 (2001). The Court rejected a challenge to Alabama’s failure to provide 
driver’s license exams in any language other than English, facts parallel to Lau. The Court said it had 
already rejected Lau’s interpretation of Title VI, if not its interpretation of the Title VI regulations. Id. 
at 285. 
 145 Id. at 280–81 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287). See generally supra note 117 and accompanying 
text (discussing Bakke).  
 146 469 U.S. at 296. 
 147 Id. at 297 (“For example, elimination of architectural barriers was one of the central aims of 
the Act, see, e.g., S. Rep. No. 93-318, p. 4 (1973), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1973, pp. 2076, 
2080, yet such barriers were clearly not erected with the aim or intent of excluding the handi-
capped.”). 
 148 Id. at 299. The endorsement of a disparate impact theory appears to be central to the Court’s 
reasoning in the case, but even if it were characterized as “considered dicta,” lower courts should 
observe it. See Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa v. Frans, 649 F.3d 849, 852–53 (8th 
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Ultimately, the Court refused to find a violation of section 504 from the dis-
parate impact created by a reduction in the number of hospital days covered by 
a state Medicaid program, but it distinguished statewide resource allocation 
decisions about public benefits from disparate impacts that include denial of 
special education services and architectural barriers that disadvantage wheel-
chair users.149 
Choate explicitly rejected the comparison of section 504 to Title VI as in-
terpreted by Guardians Ass’n, the case that eliminated damages relief for non-
intentional Title VI violations. The Court said that Guardians Ass’n made two 
holdings: “First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly reached only in-
stances of intentional discrimination. Second, the Court held that actions hav-
ing an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could be redressed through 
agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title VI.”150 This 
latter point meant that Congress delegated the selection of disparate impacts 
that the law would address to the administrative agencies writing the regula-
tions.151 The Court concluded that “Guardians, therefore, does not support [the 
state’s] blanket proposition that federal law proscribes only intentional dis-
crimination against the handicapped.”152 Citing an earlier case permitting 
monetary relief for a section 504 violation pertaining to employment, the Court 
went on to say, “Moreover, there are reasons to pause before too quickly ex-
tending even the first prong of Guardians to § 504.”153 
The disparate-impact approach focus attributed to Congress in Choate’s 
reading of section 504 is the polar opposite of animus-based intentional dis-
crimination. Professor Green captures the difference:  
Disparate impact theory presents a monumentally different concep-
tualization of discrimination than that embraced by traditional dis-
parate treatment jurisprudence. Defining discrimination in terms of 
consequence rather than purpose or motive, disparate impact theory 
                                                                                                                           
Cir. 2011) (“[F]ederal courts . . . are not free to limit Supreme Court opinions precisely to the facts of 
each case. Instead, federal courts are bound by the Supreme Court’s considered dicta almost as firmly 
as by the Court’s outright holdings . . . .” (quoting Jones v. St. Paul Cos., 495 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 
2007)); In re McDonald, 205 F.3d 606, 612 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[W]e should not idly ignore considered 
statements the Supreme Court makes in dicta.”). 
 149 Choate, 469 U.S. at 298–99. The Court reasoned that section 504 did not reach all disparate 
impacts: “Any interpretation of § 504 must therefore be responsive to two powerful but countervailing 
considerations—the need to give effect to the statutory objectives and the desire to keep § 504 within 
manageable bounds.” Id. at 299. This led to the conclusion that the across-the-board Medicaid cut did 
not transgress the statute, particularly since the federal Medicaid law delegated decisions of that type 
to the states and people with disabilities retained meaningful access to Medicaid. Id. at 302–04. 
 150 Id. at 293 (footnotes omitted). 
 151 Id. at 293–94. 
 152 Id. at 294. 
 153 Id. (citing Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 632–633 n.13 (1984) (upholding 
section 504 employment discrimination action for monetary relief)). 
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. . . require[s] that members of protected groups not be unnecessarily 
harmed . . . because of group differences.154 
The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Choate. Disavowing the 
application of Guardians Ass’n to section 504, the Court said that section 504 
itself—not its regulations but what Congress sought to do and actually enact-
ed—forbade non-intentional discrimination.   
Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by Congress to 
be most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of 
thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect. . . . [M]uch of 
the conduct that Congress sought to alter in passing the Rehabilitation 
Act would be difficult if not impossible to reach were the Act con-
strued to proscribe only conduct fueled by a discriminatory intent.155 
When Congress enacted the ADA a few years after Choate, it incorpo-
rated the disparate-impact interpretation into Title II: “It is . . . the Committee’s 
intent that section 202 [ADA Title II] . . . be interpreted consistent with Alex-
ander v. Choate.”156 The legislative history also endorses judicial decisions 
requiring reasonable accommodations157 and forbidding a practice with a dis-
parate impact on people with disabilities.158 
In the wake of Choate, many courts have eschewed any intent require-
ment in Title II and section 504 disparate impact and reasonable accommoda-
tion cases. As noted above, in Helen L., which held that failure to modify rules 
requiring services to a person with a disability be provided only if she lived in 
a nursing home violated ADA Title II, the Third Circuit rejected any need for a 
showing of animus or other intent: “Because the ADA evolved from an attempt 
to remedy the effects of ‘benign neglect’ resulting from the ‘invisibility’ of the 
disabled, Congress could not have intended to limit the Act’s protections and 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural Account of 
Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 136 (2003). 
 155 Choate, 469 U.S. at 295–97 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Court made extensive 
reference to the legislative history of section 504. Id. at 297. 
 156 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 84 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 367. For 
an extensive discussion of the propriety of using authoritative legislative history such as committee 
reports to interpret statutes, see Weber, supra note 60, at 1125–29 (collecting authorities); see also 
Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative Intent and History, 55 
B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1637–38, 1655–1656 (2014) (arguing that careful examination of legislative histo-
ry and context of legislative decisions is crucial for correct statutory interpretation). 
 157 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 50–51, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 474 (citing 
ADAPT v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1203 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring) (wheelchair lifts 
for all new buses); Nelson v. Thornburgh, 567 F. Supp. 369 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (readers for blind public 
aid caseworkers), aff’d, 732 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 158 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 71–72, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 354 (citing 
Stutts v. Freeman, 694 F.2d 666 (11th Cir. 1983) (elimination of written test for heavy-equipment 
operator with reading disability)). 
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prohibitions to circumstances involving deliberate discrimination.”159 In Hen-
rietta D. v. Giuliani, the plaintiffs asserted that New York City failed to modify 
rules to ensure access to public benefits and services for persons with HIV.160 
The court ruled in favor of plaintiffs, holding that the government’s motive or 
intent was irrelevant to the fact of the violation.161 Other cases involving fail-
ure to furnish accommodations or failure to modify standard procedure have 
followed suit.162 The Supreme Court has not addressed intent in Title II or sec-
tion 504 cases since Choate. Nevertheless, as noted above, in Olmstead, the 
Supreme Court case enforcing the integrated-services mandate of the ADA 
Title II regulations, the Court did not impose any animus or other mental state 
                                                                                                                           
 159 46 F.3d at 335. 
 160 119 F. Supp. 2d at 206–07. 
 161 Id.  
 162 See Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 846 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(affirming preliminary injunction against application of eight-semester athletic eligibility rule to stu-
dent held back on account of disability, stating: “We cannot accept the suggestion that liability under 
Title II of the Discrimination Act must be premised on an intent to discriminate on the basis of disa-
bility.”); Ridgewood Bd. of Educ. v. N.E., 172 F.3d 238, 253 (3d Cir. 1999) (upholding section 504 
claim, stating: “[A] plaintiff need not prove that defendants’ discrimination was intentional.”), super-
seded as to statute of limitations, P.P. ex rel. Michael P. v. W. Chester Area Sch. Dist., 585 F.3d 727, 
737 (3d Cir. 2009); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 817 (D. Kan. 1994) (granting relief 
in case alleging failure to provide curb ramps and other accessible facilities, stating: “The prohibition 
of Title II applies to action that carries a discriminatory effect, regardless of the City’s motive or in-
tent.”); see also K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(upholding claim under Title II access to communications regulation with no discussion of intent, 
stating: “[I]n determining whether K.M. and D.H. were denied meaningful access to the school’s 
benefits and services, we are guided by the specific standards of the Title II effective communications 
regulation.”), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1493, 1494 (2014); Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215, 
231 n.71 (5th Cir. 2011) (upholding claim based on city’s failure to provide accessible sidewalks, 
stating: “We express no opinion as to whether (or when) a failure to make reasonable accommoda-
tions should be considered a form of intentional discrimination, a form of disparate impact discrimina-
tion, or something else entirely.”); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (uphold-
ing section 504 claim, stating: “For purposes of determining whether a particular regulation is ever 
enforceable through the implied right of action contained in a statute, the pertinent question is simply 
whether the regulation falls within the scope of the statute’s prohibition. The mens rea necessary to 
support a damages remedy is not pertinent at that stage of the analysis.”); Ability Ctr. v. City of 
Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901, 912 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Title II reaches beyond prohibiting merely intentional 
discrimination.”); Tsombanidis, 352 F.3d at 574–75 (distinguishing claim of intentional discrimination 
from claim of failure to accommodate in application of fire code to group home); Drazen v. Town of 
Stratford, No. 09CV896, 2013 WL 1385265, at *4–5 (D. Conn. Apr. 2, 2013) (in case challenging 
closing of space used for meetings of individuals recovering from substance abuse, distinguishing 
reasonable accommodation claim from intentional discrimination claim and not discussing state of 
mind for reasonable accommodation claim), vacated in part not relevant, 2013 WL 4094355 (D. 
Conn. Aug. 3, 2013); Mason v. City of Huntsville, No. CV-10-S-02794-NE, 2012 WL 4815518, at 
*14 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 10, 2012) (denying motion to dismiss ADA Title II claim based on failure to 
make modifications to ensure accessibility of public facilities, not discussing intent); Benavides v. 
Laredo Med. Ctr., No. L-08-105, 2009 WL 1755004, at *1 (S.D. Tex. June 18, 2009) (denying motion 
to dismiss claim for damages under section 504 in case alleging failure to furnish sign language inter-
preter to hospital patient, rejecting animus requirement and holding that willful failure to provide 
advantage constitutes discrimination). 
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requirement when it required the defendant state agency to provide services for 
people with intellectual disabilities outside of state institutions.163 
Consistent with the lack of any intent standard, and contrary to the inter-
pretation of Title IX in Gebser and Davis, courts have permitted respondeat 
superior liability in section 504 and ADA Title II cases.164 They do not demand 
that there be a policy or its equivalent on the part of the defendant,165 which 
would be the necessary first step in tracing adverse action back to the inten-
tional conduct of a governmental actor without using respondeat superior.166 
                                                                                                                           
 163 527 U.S. at 598. 
 164 See Paulone v. City of Frederick, 787 F. Supp. 2d 360, 372–73 (D. Md. 2011) (denying sum-
mary judgment on several claims of failure to accommodate deaf motorist following arrest for driving 
while intoxicated). The court stated:  
Both Title II of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act contemplate respondeat 
superior liability. The Fourth Circuit has said: ‘Under the ADA and similar statutes, li-
ability may be imposed on a principal for the statutory violations of its agent,’ rather 
than only for an official “policy of discrimination.” Rosen v. Montgomery County, 121 
F.3d 154, 157 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in original). See also T.W. ex rel. Wilson 
v. School Bd. of Seminole County, 610 F.3d 588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010) (stating that the 
ADA “permits an employer to be held liable for the actions of its agents,” and assum-
ing, arguendo, that the Rehabilitation Act also “permits respondeat superior liability”) 
. . . . 
Id. 
 165 Cf. Los Angeles County v. Humphries, 562 U.S. 29, 39 (2010) (holding that municipality will 
not be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 even for injunctive relief in absence of policy or custom); Monell 
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (“Congress did not intend municipalities to be held 
liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some nature caused a constitutional 
tort. . . . [A] municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory.”). 
 166 In upholding a compensatory damages verdict for a deaf person who was not accommodated 
with regard to communications during an arrest for drunk driving, the Fifth Circuit observed: 
The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits have all agreed that when a plaintiff 
asserts a cause of action against an employer-municipality, under either the ADA or the 
RA [section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act], the public entity is liable for the vicarious 
acts of any of its employees as specifically provided by the ADA. . . .  
 Furthermore, while we have not yet spoken on the question of whether a policy of 
discrimination must be identified to sustain a claim under the ADA or the RA, the 
Fourth Circuit has considered the issue and has concluded that a policy is not required. 
We agree with our sister circuit on this point. The ADA expressly provides that a disa-
bled person is discriminated against when an entity fails to “take such steps as may be 
necessary to ensure that no individual with a disability is excluded, denied services, 
segregated or otherwise treated differently than other individuals because of the absence 
of auxiliary aids and services.” A plain reading of the ADA evidences that Congress in-
tended to impose an affirmative duty on public entities to create policies or procedures 
to prevent discrimination based on disability. Thus, although it is true that for claims 
asserted under § 1983, an official policy must be identified, the same rule cannot be 
reconciled with Congress’s legislative objectives in enacting the ADA and the RA, and 
Victoria County has not cited any authority supporting this position. 
Delano-Pyle v. Victoria County, 302 F.3d 567, 574–75 (5th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). The court 
said deliberate indifference was not required, although it did say that intentional discrimination was 
needed for a damages claim; it said the facts supported a finding of intentional discrimination because 
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Of course, finding violations of ADA Title II and section 504 based on non-
intentional conduct is fully consistent with what courts do in ADA Title I em-
ployment cases.167 
3. Remedies for Non-Intentional Discrimination Under ADA Title II and 
Section 504 
The Title VI and Title IX caselaw also leaves disability discrimination 
remedies unaffected. To repeat, the remedies of ADA Title II are those of sec-
tion 504, and the remedies of section 504 are those of Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act.168 A facile reading of Sandoval, the last word on Title VI from the 
Supreme Court, might suggest that no private remedies exist at all for disparate 
impact cases under Title II and section 504, and that compensatory damages 
and all other remedies169 are available only for intentional wrongdoing, that is, 
animus-based conduct under Bakke, Guardians Ass’n, and the equal protection 
references, and for deliberate indifference under the Title IX caselaw. Unless 
reasonable accommodation cases are deemed to be intentional discrimination 
actions, they would then be in some remedial limbo, for they have no analogue 
in Title VI. 
That reading runs straight into Choate, however, which said disparate im-
pact claims were the primary cases Congress wanted to address with section 
504, and does not even have support in Sandoval. Sandoval reasoned that Title 
VI itself, in section 601 of the Civil Rights Act, reaches only intentional con-
duct.170 Conduct with a disparate impact is not outlawed, but instead is “per-
missible under § 601.”171 Disparate impacts can be addressed only by the regu-
lations authorized under section 602.172 The Court recognized that authoritative 
regulations interpreting a statute are enforceable through a private right of ac-
tion whenever the statute can be privately enforced: “A Congress that intends 
the statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the authori-
                                                                                                                           
it was clear from video evidence that the plaintiff could not understand the police officer but the of-
ficer continued to use verbal communication. This “intent” requirement was thus merely the intention 
not to accommodate, and was not the application of a requirement of animus or intent of the Title VI-
Title IX-Equal Protection variety. 
 167 See supra text accompanying notes 62–70 (discussing absence of intent requirement in Title I 
reasonable accommodation cases). Needless to say, as with Title I employment cases, some claims 
alleging discrimination barred by Title II will require a showing of intent, for example, claims alleging 
retaliation. See D.B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 40 (1st Cir. 2012) (rejecting retaliation claim for lack of 
evidence of animus). 
 168 See supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 169 Except for punitive damages. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189 (2002). See generally 
infra text accompanying notes 181–188 (discussing Barnes). 
 170 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280. 
 171 Id. at 281. 
 172 Id. at 281, 286. 
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tative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well.”173 But according 
to the Court, the Title VI disparate impact regulations do not interpret section 
601; on the contrary, they “forbid conduct that § 601 permits.”174 Therefore the 
private right of action to enforce Title VI does not apply to the disparate impact 
regulations.175 
However, the Court in Sandoval explicitly placed Choate’s discussion of 
disparate impact under section 504 into the category of authoritative interpreta-
tions of the statute, rather than extensions of the statute that forbid conduct the 
statute permits.176 It is hard to imagine that the Sandoval Court could do oth-
erwise, because the relevant discussion in Choate emphasized that uninten-
tional discrimination is what Congress wanted to forbid by passing section 
504. Thus, disparate impact is the heart of the statutory duty under section 504 
and Title II of the ADA, and the private right of action under these two statutes 
embraces disparate impact. It is also hard to imagine that the private cause of 
action could be read to exclude failure to make reasonable modifications, a 
violation that is closer to intentional discrimination on the spectrum of mens 
rea177 and is also the most celebrated innovation in disability discrimination 
law.178 
                                                                                                                           
 173 Id. at 284. 
 174 Id. at 285. 
 175 Id. at 285–86. 
 176 Id. The court stated: 
The many cases that respondents say have “assumed” that a cause of action to enforce a 
statute includes one to enforce its regulations illustrate (to the extent that cases in which 
an issue was not presented can illustrate anything) only this point [regarding authorita-
tive interpretations]; each involved regulations of the [authoritative interpretation] type 
we have just described, as respondents conceded at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. 
See . . . School Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U. S. 273, 279–281 (1987) (regula-
tions defining the terms “physical impairment” and “major life activities” in § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); . . . Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S., at 299, 309 (regula-
tions clarifying what sorts of disparate impacts upon the handicapped were covered by 
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which the Court assumed included some such 
impacts).  
Id. (citations omitted). At another point the Court also cited with approval Choate’s interpretation of 
Title VI when Choate was cautioning against applying Title VI caselaw to section 504 cases. Id. at 
281. 
 177 The position here is not that failure to provide reasonable accommodation is intentional dis-
crimination as the Court defined the term for purposes of equal protection, Title VI, or Title IX, but it 
may be noted that one recent decision, after extensively reviewing holdings in accommodations cases, 
reached the conclusion that a denial of reasonable accommodations is intentional discrimination suffi-
cient to support damage claims. Borum v. Swisher County, No. 2:14-CV-127-J, 2015 WL 327508, at 
*8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 26, 2015) (denying motion for summary judgment in ADA and section 504 action 
for failure to accommodate prisoner with multiple disabilities by modifying feeding and medical care 
practices). For a similar approach, see Delano-Pyle, 302 F.3d at 574–75 (discussed supra note 166). 
 178 See supra text accompanying notes 57–61 (discussing reasonable accommodation); see also 
Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming damages 
award for failure to provide accommodations on bar exam, reasoning that policy of denying accom-
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If Sandoval thus falls out of the remedial picture for ADA Title II and sec-
tion 504 claims, what of Guardians Ass’n?179 Could there be a private cause of 
action for disparate impacts but no monetary relief when the discrimination is 
unintentional? But Guardians Ass’n is no more applicable than Sandoval. As 
the Court emphasized in Sandoval, Guardians Ass’n barred monetary relief for 
disparate impact discrimination because the statute—Title VI itself—outlawed 
only intentional discrimination.180 Its holding is not relevant when a statute, as 
authoritatively interpreted by its regulations, forbids disparate impact discrimi-
nation. Under the provisions incorporating Title VI remedies into section 504 
and ADA Title II, all actual violations of section 504 and Title II, including the 
disparate impacts to which it extends and failures to make reasonable modifi-
cations, call for the remedies permitted for actual violations of Title VI. The 
actual violations of Title VI are intentional discrimination; in contrast, the ac-
tual violations of section 504 and ADA Title II embrace a wide range of con-
duct with disparate impacts, as well as failure to make reasonable accommoda-
                                                                                                                           
modations based on results of unreliable disability evaluation constituted deliberate indifference), 
vacated and remanded on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999). The court in Helen L. reinforced the 
conclusion that reasonable accommodation is at the heart of section 504 and the ADA by stressing the 
centrality of the duties imposed in the section 504 regulations to what Congress explicitly commanded 
in Title II: 
Moreover, because Congress mandated that the ADA regulations be patterned after the 
section 504 coordination regulations, the former regulations have the force of law. 
When Congress re-enacts a statute and voices its approval of an administrative interpre-
tation of that statute, that interpretation acquires the force of law and courts are bound 
by the regulation. The same is true when Congress agrees with an administrative inter-
pretation of a statute which Congress is re-enacting. Although Title II of the ADA is not 
a re-enactment of section 504, it does extend section 504’s anti-discrimination princi-
ples to public entities. Furthermore, the legislative history of the ADA shows that Con-
gress agreed with the coordination regulations promulgated under section 504. See, e.g., 
S. Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1989) (“The first purpose of [Title II] is to 
make applicable the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of disability, cur-
rently set out in regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973, to . . . state and local governments . . . .”); H.R. Rep. No. 485(III), 101st Cong., 
2d. Sess. 50. (“The general prohibitions set forth in the section 504 regulations are ap-
plicable to all programs and activities in Title II”). 
46 F.3d at 332 (case citations omitted); see Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 273 (“The obligation reasonably 
to accommodate derives from the statute itself.”); see also Frame, 657 F.3d at 224 (upholding claim 
based on city’s failure to provide accessible sidewalks, reasoning that relevant regulations “apply Title 
II’s substantive ban on disability discrimination”). Some courts have maintained that not all the duties 
included in the Title II regulations are sufficiently closely tied to the statute to support a private cause 
of action, however. See Ability Ctr., 385 F.3d at 907–15 (affirming relief in Title II claim regarding 
curb ramps under accessibility regulation but holding that violations of regulation requiring transition 
plan are not actionable); cf. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 939 (“[T]o be enforceable through the § 504 im-
plied private right of action, regulations must be tightly enough linked to § 504 that they authoritative-
ly construe that statutory section, rather than impose new obligations.”). 
 179 Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 582. 
 180 Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 281. 
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tions. There is no barrier in Guardians Ass’n or Sandoval for compensatory 
damages or other monetary relief for those violations. 
The only Supreme Court case discussing ADA Title II remedies is Barnes 
v. Gorman, in which a man with paraplegia who used a wheelchair obtained a 
verdict of over $1 million in compensatory damages and $1.2 million in puni-
tive damages for injuries he sustained when he fell off the bench in a police 
van while being transported after an arrest.181 According to the Court, his “suit 
claimed petitioners had discriminated against respondent on the basis of his 
disability, in violation of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 
by failing to maintain appropriate policies for the arrest and transportation of 
persons with spinal cord injuries.”182 It was thus a case based on failure to pro-
vide reasonable modifications to the police department’s ordinary procedures, 
which permitted transportation in a van not equipped to accommodate wheel-
chair users. The Court overturned the punitive damages award.183 It looked to 
the ADA provision adopting section 504 remedies, which in turn adopts Title 
VI remedies. The Court declared that Title VI, as a Spending Clause statute, “is 
much in the nature of a contract” and extended the contract analysis to reme-
dies.184 Compensatory damages and injunctions are traditionally available in 
contract actions, and federal grant recipients should be aware of their availabil-
ity when they accept the funding that is subject to Title VI’s restrictions (and 
those of section 504 and ADA Title II).185 Punitive damages are not ordinarily 
available for breach of contract, however, so they are not proper remedies for a 
violation.186 
Barnes did nothing to disturb the compensatory damages remedy for fail-
ure to provide accommodations. In fact, it reinforced the conclusion that com-
pensatory damages are available for failures to provide reasonable modifica-
tions: 
Our conclusion is consistent with the “well settled” rule that “where 
legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a 
general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any 
available remedy to make good the wrong done.” When a federal-
funds recipient violates conditions of Spending Clause legislation, 
the wrong done is the failure to provide what the contractual obliga-
tion requires; and that wrong is “made good” when the recipient 
                                                                                                                           
 181 536 U.S. at 184. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 189–90. 
 184 Id. at 186. 
 185 Id. at 187. 
 186 Id. at 187–88. 
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compensates the Federal Government or a third-party beneficiary (as 
in this case) for the loss caused by that failure.187 
Compensatory damages and other monetary relief thus may be required to 
make good the losses due to failure to modify policies and procedures and pro-
vide accommodations. 
Similarly, Barnes did nothing to limit compensatory remedies in disparate 
impact cases, and its contract law analysis suggests that monetary relief should 
be available when disparate impact could be expected to cause losses that 
money can remedy. The measure of damages in contract cases is ordinarily that 
of reasonable expectations, so monetary relief based on that measure should be 
available in ADA Title II and section 504 disparate impact actions.188 
Thus, broad remedies, consistent with concepts of reasonable expecta-
tions of loss, and including compensatory damages and other monetary relief, 
are available for violations of section 504 and the ADA’s reasonable accom-
modations and disparate impact discrimination provisions. The legislative his-
tory of Title II emphasizes that a wide range of remedies exists for violations 
of the statute. The House Committee Report states that Congress intended to 
make the “full panoply of [section 504] remedies available” in Title II cases,189 
and cited a case providing damages against a governmental unit under section 
504.190 
                                                                                                                           
 187 Id. at 189 (citations omitted). 
 188 See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 12.1(1), at 752 (2d ed. 1993) (“[Contract] [d]amages 
remedies most frequently aim at protecting the plaintiff’s expectation or expectancy interest. . . . (The 
expectation interest may also be protected by specific performance.).”) (footnotes omitted); see also 
MCCORMICK, supra note 86, § 138, at 562 (“[D]amages for breach of contract can be recovered only 
for such losses as were reasonably foreseeable, when the contract was made, by the party to be 
charged.”). 
 189 H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 3, at 52 n.62, as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 475 n.62 (cit-
ing Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982)). 
 190 Id. at 52; see Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 289 n.18. The Henrietta D. court stated:  
The legislative history indicates that Congress intended the “full panoply of remedies” 
to be available [in a reasonable modifications case under ADA Title II], H.R. Rep. No. 
485, pt. 2, at 98 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381; H.R. Rep. No. 485, 
pt. 3, at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 475, and the House Judiciary 
Committee Report cited as an example of the remedies available under Title II, the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1982), which 
held that an implied private right of action for damages and injunctive relief was avail-
able under § 504 where officials were sued in their official capacities, H.R. Rep. No. 
485, Pt. 3, at 52 n. 62, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 475 n. 62. 
331 F.3d at 289 n.18. 
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Of course, availability of a remedy does not mean that it should be grant-
ed in every case. The propriety of various forms of relief in non-intentional 
disability discrimination cases is discussed below.191 
IV. INSISTING ON INTENT: THREE ERRORS 
A number of prominent opinions from the lower courts demand showings 
of intent in section 504 and ADA Title II cases, particularly those that request 
monetary relief. Courts in these cases commit three errors. The first, the mis-
guided use of analogies to Title VI and Title IX cases, has been explored above 
and is found in cases covering a range of subject matters. The other two are 
peculiar to elementary and secondary education cases: the reliance on a 1982 
appellate case that was dubious when written and is now legislatively over-
ruled, and a related, unnecessary effort to avoid a conflict between section 504-
ADA remedies and those of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. 
A. Misguided Analogies to Guardians Ass’n and the Title IX Cases 
Despite Alexander v. Choate’s rejection of Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Ser-
vice Commission in interpreting section 504, a number of courts have applied 
the case when making decisions about remedies in Title II ADA and section 
504 reasonable modification cases. Thus, they require that the plaintiff show 
intentional discrimination in order to obtain monetary relief, though usually 
they also apply the Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District-Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Education interpretation of Title IX and allow delib-
erate indifference to suffice. It is as though the courts are reading an aggravat-
ed denial of accommodations requirement into the statute in monetary relief 
cases. 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See infra text accompanying notes 248–261. There might be some concern about whether 
Eleventh Amendment principles give state government entities immunity from monetary relief in Title 
II ADA and section 504 cases. The Supreme Court held that state workers could not obtain back wag-
es under ADA Title I when the disability discrimination did not rise to a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and was not within the area that could be banned prophylactically to prevent constitu-
tional violations. Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372–73 (2001). The Court, however, also ruled 
that Congress validly abrogated state immunity in Title II cases, at least those that implicate funda-
mental rights such as access to courts and public court proceedings, Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 
529 (2004), and lower courts have extended Lane’s reasoning to cases involving education, see Bow-
ers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 475 F.3d 524, 556 (3d Cir. 2007); Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 
24, 40 (1st Cir. 2006); Ass’n for Disabled Ams., Inc. v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 405 F.3d 954, 959 (11th Cir. 
2005). Moreover, courts have agreed that acceptance of federal funds constitutes a valid waiver of 
constitutional immunities for purposes of section 504 claims. See, e.g., Miller v. Tex. Tech. Univ. 
Health Scis. Ctr., 421 F.3d 342, 349 (5th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 
1082 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). Finally, units of local government, which typically include school 
districts, are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. 
of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280–81 (1977). 
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For example, in Meagley v. City of Little Rock, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed a district court judgment against the plaintiff in a case in which she al-
leged that the incline of a bridge in a pathway of the municipal zoo was too 
steep to meet ADA accessibility standards, which caused her electric rental 
scooter to tip over, injuring her.192 The district court ruled that the plaintiff had 
failed to prove the city acted with deliberate indifference.193 In upholding the 
need for the showing, the court of appeals reasoned that the ADA and section 
504 were modeled on Title VI and adopt Title VI’s remedies.194 It cited Guard-
ians Ass’n’s statement that no compensatory relief should be given in Title VI 
cases unless discriminatory animus is shown and concluded that “Meagley’ s 
claims under both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act thus require proof of dis-
criminatory intent to recover compensatory damages.”195 The court said that 
deliberate indifference, rather than “personal ill will or animosity,” was the 
appropriate test for intentional discrimination in such a case, but that since 
there was no evidence the zoo knew that the bridge was out of compliance 
with ADA standards, blocked it off immediately after the accident, and later 
modified it so it was flat, deliberate indifference was not shown.196 The court 
did not consider Choate’s rejection of Guardians Ass’n in interpreting section 
504. It did not recognize the fundamental difference between statutes such as 
Title VI and Title IX, for which intentional conduct is the only conduct that 
violates the statute, and section 504 and the ADA, where the authoritative in-
terpretation of the statute embraces unintentional conduct, as the Supreme 
Court recognized in Alexander v. Sandoval. 
In another example of the same reasoning, the Tenth Circuit affirmed a 
grant of summary judgment against family members who alleged that the state 
motor vehicle agency failed to provide a reasonable accommodation by allow-
ing someone other than the parent or guardian of a student driver to supervise 
her practice driving when the student’s parent was blind and thus did not quali-
fy for a driver’s license.197 The family proposed that her grandfather could 
provide the supervision.198 The state refused the proposal because the grandfa-
ther did not have legal guardianship of the student, though ultimately the legis-
lature amended the statute and the student completed the required supervised 
                                                                                                                           
 192 639 F.3d 384, 386 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 193 Id. at 387 (“The court ruled that Meagley had not provided proof of intentional discrimination 
which was required to obtain compensatory damages . . . .”). 
 194 Id. at 389. 
 195 Id. (citing Guardians Ass’n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (1983)). 
 196 Id. at 390. 
 197 Barber v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 562 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2009). The court did not discuss 
the relief requested, but since the student had her license by the time the case was adjudicated and the 
statute was amended, monetary relief would be the only remedy that could keep the case from becom-
ing moot. 
 198 Id. at 1225. 
1452 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:1417 
driving with her grandfather.199 The court demanded a showing of intentional 
discrimination, though like the court in Meagley, it said deliberate indifference 
would be enough, stating that the state officials offered a limited guardianship, 
which would be “eminently reasonable,” but going on to say that there was no 
deliberate indifference because the senior official seemed “genuinely con-
cerned” and “very sympathetic,” and the state promptly amended the statute.200 
The first point the court made suggests that the state did in fact offer a reason-
able modification, which could be grounds for rejecting the claim, but that has 
nothing to do with intent or deliberate indifference. The second point about 
concern and sympathy falls right into the problem that Congress was attempt-
ing to solve by enacting section 504 and the ADA.201 Concern and sympathy 
are not what the statutes require.202 Modifications are. 
Many cases that employ the Guardians Ass’n-Title IX analogy concern 
education services for children with disabilities. Like the non-special education 
decisions discussed above, they make the analogy and demand intent, which 
they typically say may be met with a showing of deliberate indifference. Sim-
ple refusal to offer reasonable modifications is not enough. In several instanc-
es, it is clear that the plaintiff framed the case in terms of intentional discrimi-
nation, so the use of intentional discrimination standards is not surprising.203 
Nevertheless, many other claims could readily be described as failure to make 
reasonable modifications to practices, such as the use of misguided discipli-
nary techniques when because of the child’s disability the disciplinary practic-
                                                                                                                           
 199 Id. at 1227. 
 200 Id. at 1230. 
 201 In some cases, plaintiffs prevail (or at least survive dispositive motions) even when the delib-
erate indifference standard is imposed; most of these cases fall into categories other than K–12 educa-
tion. See, e.g., Liese v. Indian River Cty. Hosp. Dist., 701 F.3d 334 (11th Cir. 2012) (reversing sum-
mary judgment for hospital in section 504 case for compensatory damages for failure to respond to 
repeated requests for sign-language interpreter for woman seeking emergency room treatment includ-
ing emergency removal of gallbladder; applying deliberate indifference standard and collecting cases); 
Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2009) (vacating grant of summary judg-
ment to defendant in case in which hospital failed to provide sign language interpreter and other 
communication assistance despite repeated requests; applying deliberate indifference). 
 202 Hence the title of a prominent account of the ADA’s enactment: JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: 
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1994). A judge applying the 
deliberate indifference standard who nonetheless understood this lesson is Judge Kobayashi in Mark 
H. v. Hamamoto, No. 00-00282, 2012 WL 3444138, at *1 (D. Haw. Aug. 14, 2012) (in damages ac-
tion for failure to provide autism-related education services in violation of section 504, excluding 
evidence of education department employees’ good faith beliefs and sincerity and testimony that they 
had children’s best interests at heart). 
 203 See, e.g., S.H. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 260 (3d Cir. 2013) (in case of child 
who was mistakenly identified as child with disabilities but in fact was not disabled and lost opportu-
nities for advanced coursework, affirming summary judgment in favor of district, relying on absence 
of knowledge on part of district of wrong diagnosis); T.W. v. Sch. Bd. of Seminole Cty., 610 F.3d 
588, 604 (11th Cir. 2010); S.S. v. E. Ky. Univ., 532 F.3d 445, 452–56 (6th Cir. 2008). 
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es interfere with learning.204 The courts apply the intentional discrimination 
test nonetheless. 
An education decision that gets this part of the analysis right (but, as ar-
gued below, commits a different interpretive error) is the original Fifth Circuit 
panel opinion in Stewart v. Waco Independent School District.205 Stewart in-
volved a student with a cognitive disability and speech and hearing impair-
ments.206 Following an instance of sexual contact between the student and 
peers at school, the defendant modified the student’s educational program to 
provide for separating her from male students and keeping her under close su-
pervision.207 Nevertheless, she was sexually assaulted on two later occasions 
                                                                                                                           
 204 See, e.g., T.W., 610 F.3d at 607 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (“T.W.’s disability manifested itself in 
several specific behaviors that were expected, normal, and uncontrollable for him. . . . In light of these 
known symptoms, which were characteristic of T.W.’s disabilities, the assessment warns and reiter-
ates at multiple points that physical contact with T.W. was to be avoided at all costs due to the harm 
that it would cause him.”); see also Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 537 Fed. App’x 90, 
96 (3d Cir. 2013) (applying deliberate indifference standard in case of long-term failure to provide 
child educational services adapted to her disabilities, but reversing summary judgment against plain-
tiff on claim); Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 939 (9th Cir. 2008) (applying deliberate indiffer-
ence standard despite characterizing failure to provide services for children with autism as lack of 
reasonable accommodation, but overturning summary judgment for defendant); Patrick B. v. Paradise 
Protectory & Agric. Sch., No. 1:11-CV-00927, 2012 WL 3233036, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 6, 2012) 
(denying motion to dismiss but requiring intent in section 504 action for damages in action over fail-
ure to make appropriate assessments and adapt disciplinary measures to child’s disability); Alexander 
v. Lawrence Cty. Bd. of Developmental Disabilities, No. 1:10-CV-697, 2012 WL 831769, at *11 
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2012) (denying motion for judgment on pleadings in case alleging frequent re-
straint of child; requiring intent but ruling that inference of intent may be drawn from improper action 
based on disability); A.M. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 840 F. Supp. 2d 660, 683 (E.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(granting summary judgment in case concerning failure to accommodate dietary needs of child for 
want of evidence of deliberate indifference); Zachary M. v. Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 2d 649, 662 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (requiring intentional discrimination in case over allegations of inadequate accommo-
dations for child with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, noting that it may be inferred from de-
liberate indifference, and ruling in favor of school district); Kaitlin C. v. Cheltenham Twp. Sch. Dist., 
No. 07-2930, 2010 WL 786530, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2010) (requiring deliberate indifference and 
dismissing claim in case of failure to follow restrictions on child’s physical activity); Brenneise v. San 
Diego Unified Sch. Dist., No. 08CV28, 2008 WL 4853329, at *11 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2008) (dismiss-
ing section 504 and ADA claims in case alleging failure to accommodate need for tube feeding and to 
make other services available, applying deliberate indifference standard, and declaring that child was 
treated similarly to students without disabilities); S. L.-M. v. Dieringer Sch. Dist. No. 343, 614 
F. Supp. 2d 1152, 1159–62 (W.D. Wash. 2008) (requiring intent defined as deliberate indifference in 
case in which promised program modifications were not provided, but denying summary judgment for 
defendant); AP v. Anoka-Hennepin Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Minn. 2008) 
(requiring culpable intent in form of deliberate indifference and granting summary judgment for de-
fendant on claim of failure to train personnel to administer glucagon in an emergency to child with 
diabetes; denying motion on claims concerning blood testing and insulin pump). 
 205 711 F.3d 513, 522–23 (5th Cir. 2013), vacated & superseded on reh’g, No. 11-51067, 2013 
WL 2398860 (5th Cir. June 3, 2013). On petition for rehearing and rehearing en banc, the court issued 
a nonprecedential decision remanding the case to the district court to consider potential exhaustion 
and limitations defenses. 
 206 Id. at 517. 
 207 Id. 
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and subjected to a student exposing himself on another occasion; the defendant 
responded to two of the incidents by suspending her.208 She alleged, among 
other things, that the defendant failed to provide her with accommodations 
needed to prevent repeated peer sexual abuse.209 
Judge Haynes said that the student’s section 504 claim premised on alle-
gations of deliberate indifference and based on the analogy to Title IX was 
properly dismissed, but the judge contrasted that claim with one based on fail-
ure to make reasonable accommodations. She wrote that “Stewart pleads no 
facts showing that the District knew its responses to each incident created an 
obvious and substantial risk of recurring abuse, and municipal-liability prece-
dent precludes equating negligence with deliberate indifference,” but went on 
to say that “Stewart may nonetheless state a § 504 claim based on the District’s 
alleged refusal to make reasonable accommodations for her disabilities.”210 
On the reasonable accommodation claim, the court said that an action lies 
even when there is no explicit refusal to make an accommodation, in instances 
“where a district’s course of action goes strongly against the grain of accepted 
standards of educational practice.”211 The court applied a gross-misjudgment 
standard to that situation, saying that the standard differs from deliberate indif-
ference, and is in fact “a species of heightened negligence” that should be 
“measured by professional standards of educational practice.”212 The plaintiff 
plausibly stated such a claim.213 The panel thus refused to employ the analogy 
to Title VI and Title IX in an action for monetary relief under section 504 for 
failure to provide reasonable modifications. As discussed below, its embrace of 
a gross-misjudgment standard for the claim lacks statutory support, but the 
critical departure from other courts is that it treated denial of a reasonable ac-
commodation, without evil intent or deliberate indifference, as the violation of 
section 504 and the ADA that it demonstrably is. 
Other education cases that avoid the intent-deliberate indifference trap in-
clude one in which a child, who was allegedly abused by an aide and a teacher, 
stated a claim under the ADA and section 504 by alleging that normal abuse 
reporting and investigation procedures were not followed because the defend-
ant school board discredited the child’s allegations due to his severe disabil-
                                                                                                                           
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. at 522–23. 
 211 Id. at 523. 
 212 Id. at 525. 
 213 Id. at 526. A recent decision that separates the reasonable accommodation and intentional 
discrimination claims and does not embrace the bad faith-gross misjudgment standard, yet comes 
down against the student, is CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland School District, 743 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 
2014) (affirming summary judgment in favor of school district in case concerning accommodations 
for student with diabetes). 
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ity.214 The court imposed no intent or any other state of mind requirement. Par-
aphrasing the plaintiff’s argument, it asked whether “the Board of Education 
failed to provide John with equal access to a safe educational environment,” 
and said the complaint provided sufficient facts to state a claim for relief.215 In 
another case, the court denied a motion to dismiss section 504 and ADA claims 
when the complaint alleged that the defendant refused to accommodate a stu-
dent with an anxiety disorder and post-traumatic stress syndrome by separating 
her from the brother of an individual who had been convicted of molesting her 
sister.216 The complaint alleged that the brother was repeatedly placed in the 
student’s class and that both brothers harassed her at school.217 The court drew 
no analogy to Title VI or Title IX and demanded no intent or deliberate indif-
ference on the part of the defendant. It sustained the complaint simply on the 
basis that it alleged that the denial of a modification, separating M.S. from the 
two brothers, “denied M.S. the benefits of an educational program.”218 Still 
other cases uphold claims based on failure to provide real-time captioning ser-
vices for students with hearing impairments, in violation of the ADA Title II 
regulation that requires equally effective communication for people with disa-
bilities, without any mention of the state of mind of the defendant.219 
B. The Strange Legacy of Monahan v. Nebraska in Elementary and 
Secondary Education Accommodations Cases 
Many courts that do not impose an intent requirement (and some that do) 
nevertheless dismiss section 504 and ADA claims brought by students with disa-
bilities against educational authorities on the ground that a violation necessitates 
“something more than a mere failure to provide the ‘free appropriate education’ 
                                                                                                                           
 214 Doe ex rel. Doe v. Darien Bd. of Educ., No. 3:11cv1581, 2012 WL 4092662, at *4 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 17, 2012). 
 215 Id. at *9. 
 216 M.S. v. Marple Newtown Sch. Dist., No. 11-5857, 2012 WL 3815563, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 
2012). 
 217 Id. at *1. 
 218 Id. at *4. 
 219 K.M. ex rel. Bright v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088, 1100 (9th Cir. 2013) (revers-
ing summary judgment in favor of school district on claim that failure to provide communication-
access real-time translation (“CART”) violated ADA effective-communication regulation, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 35.160, which requires accommodations including auxiliary aids and services for individuals with 
disabilities), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1493 (2014), on remand, D.H. ex rel. Harrington v. Poway Uni-
fied Sch. Dist., No. 09-cv-2621, 2013 WL 6730163 (S.D Cal. Dec. 19, 2013) (granting preliminary 
injunction), reconsideration denied, 2014 WL 129070 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014). This reasoning ex-
tends to cases demanding damages. Poway Unified Sch. Dist. v. K.C. ex rel. Cheng, No. 10CV897, 
2014 WL 129086, at *7 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2014) (dismissing claim for injunction as moot, but not 
dismissing damages claim brought by graduated student over school district’s past failure to provide 
CART; noting evidence of failure to provide student “an equal opportunity to gain the same benefit as 
her nondisabled peers” but denying student summary judgment on issue). 
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required by” the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”).220 These 
courts require “that either bad faith or gross misjudgment should be shown be-
fore a § 504 violation can be made out, at least in the context of education of 
handicapped children.”221 Like the courts that insist on intent, these courts de-
mand aggravated denial of reasonable accommodation instead of simply asking 
whether the defendant failed to make the accommodation. Bad faith satisfies the 
demand, although huge departures from professional judgment do too. This is 
not precisely an intent requirement, nor exactly the same as deliberate indiffer-
ence, but it is close, and its practical effect is the same. In fact, the court that 
originated the language later referred to the bad faith-gross misjudgment stand-
ard as an intent requirement.222 
The origin of the language is dicta223 from Monahan v. Nebraska, an 
Eighth Circuit case from 1982 concerning the legitimacy of a procedure for 
appeals in disputes over special education services, in which plaintiffs alleged 
                                                                                                                           
 220 Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir. 1982). See generally 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1412(a)(1)(A) (2012) (imposing duty on states accepting federal special education funds to guaran-
tee provision of “free, appropriate public education” to all children with disabilities). 
 221 Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171. 
 222 M.Y. ex rel. J.Y. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 544 F.3d 885, 890 (8th Cir. 2008). The court 
stated:  
There is no evidence in the record that District possessed the requisite bad faith or gross 
misjudgment in denying M.Y. special education transportation. District’s decision fully 
complied with the terms of M.Y.’s IEP [Individualized Education Program] which stat-
ed that M.Y. was not eligible for ESY [Extended School Year] and related services 
such as transportation. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of District on the basis that District did not possess the req-
uisite intent in order to be liable under section 504. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also D.A. ex rel. Latasha A. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 629 F.3d 450, 455 
(5th Cir. 2010) (“We concur that facts creating an inference of professional bad faith or gross mis-
judgment are necessary to substantiate a cause of action for intentional discrimination under § 504 or 
ADA against a school district predicated on a disagreement over compliance with IDEA.”) (emphasis 
added); Baker v. S. York Cty. Sch. Dist., No. 1:08-CV-1741, 2012 WL 6561434, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 
17, 2012) (“The Third Circuit has not articulated the level of intent necessary for a showing of inten-
tional discrimination [for a section 504 damages claim]. Several circuit courts have adopted a ‘delib-
erate indifference’ standard. Other circuits require a more stringent showing of ‘bad faith or gross 
misjudgment.’”) (citations omitted); A.G. v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., No. 11-5025, 2012 WL 
4473244, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 28, 2012) (“[A] plaintiff must adduce some ‘evidence of intent, such as 
bad faith, gross misjudgment, or deliberate indifference, to sustain a claim for compensatory damages’ 
under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.”) (citations omitted); J.D. ex rel. Degelia v. Georgetown 
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. A-10-CA-717LY, 2011 WL 2971284, at *7 (W.D. Tex. July 21, 2011) (linking 
bad faith-gross misjudgment standard to supposed requirement of showing “animus toward . . . disa-
bled children”). 
 223 See Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1170 (“Our affirmance of a dismissal without prejudice technically 
leaves the way open to a re-filing of these cases on a new complaint. We have no wish to breed litiga-
tion that will do no one any good, so we add a few words for the guidance of the District Court and 
the parties if the matter is pursued.”). It is dicta also in the sense that what section 504 might require 
regarding impartiality on appeals of hearings (the issue in Monahan) has little bearing on what consti-
tutes reasonable accommodation in provision of education and other public services. 
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that the state commissioner of education reviewed decisions of hearing officers 
in violation of the impartiality provisions of the law that is now IDEA, thus 
also violating section 504.224 The court said it had the “duty to harmonize the 
Rehabilitation Act [section 504] and [IDEA] to the fullest extent possible, and 
to give each of these statutes the full play intended by Congress.”225 The court 
said it also wanted to balance interests of children with disabilities and state 
educational officials and to pull courts out of the fray of educational dis-
putes.226 The sole direct authority on which the court relied for its bad faith-gross 
misjudgment standard was a case concerning violations of substantive due pro-
cess in the treatment of persons with cognitive impairments involuntarily 
committed to state institutions, a decision that required a substantial departure 
from professional practice to make out a constitutional violation.227 Many 
courts have relied on the language in Monahan to insist on a showing of gross 
misjudgment or bad faith conduct before they will consider a section 504 or 
ADA claim for monetary relief that arises in the setting of elementary and sec-
ondary education.228 
Reliance on Monahan, however, is an error. The federal special education 
law was amended after Monahan to include the following language: 
  
                                                                                                                           
 224 Id. at 1167. The law was then known as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, Pub. 
L. No. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 225 Monahan, 687 F.2d at 1171. 
 226 See id. (“The standard of liability we suggest here accomplishes this result and also reflects 
what we believe to be a proper balance between the rights of handicapped children, the responsibilities 
of state educational officials, and the competence of courts to make judgments in technical fields.”). 
 227 See id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982)). With regard to Youngberg, one 
might wonder why, if the duty to avoid bad faith and gross misjudgment as to services for people with 
disabilities already existed under the Constitution, Congress felt the need to enact section 504 and the 
ADA. Youngberg demonstrated that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 already furnished a remedy for constitutional 
violations. See Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309. 
 228 E.g., C.L. v. Scarsdale Union Free Sch. Dist., 744 F.3d 826, 840 (2d Cir. 2014); B.M. ex rel. 
Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., 732 F.3d 882, 887 (8th Cir. 2013); G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. 
Schs., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013); Stewart, 711 F.3d at 523–26; D.A., 629 F.3d at 454–55; 
M.Y., 544 F.3d at 889–90; Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir. 1998). 
Claimants in those cases sought monetary relief, though one court applied the dictum in a case seeking 
compensatory education. B.M. ex rel. Miller v. S. Callaway R-II Sch. Dist., No. 11-4029, 2012 WL 
5818001, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 15, 2012), aff’d, 732 F.3d 882 (8th Cir. 2013). The court of appeals 
did not discuss the extension of the doctrine, and the case appears to be an outlier. See id.; see also 
K.D. v. Starr, 55 F. Supp. 3d 782, 788–89 (D. Md. 2014) (requiring showing of bad faith or gross 
misjudgment in nondamages case but upholding claim). Cases applying the gross misjudgment-bad 
faith standard and upholding plaintiffs’ claims include the original panel opinion in Stewart, 711 F.3d 
513. See also M.P. ex rel. K. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 439 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2006) (permit-
ting claim based on school district’s conduct following disclosure of student’s schizophrenia); Cen-
tennial Sch. Dist. v. S.D., No. 10-CV-4129, 2011 WL 2441297, at *3–5 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2011) 
(permitting compensatory damages claims under section 504 and ADA). In many cases, the courts 
rely on other courts’ repetition of the Monahan language rather than tracing the language back to its 
origins. 
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Rule of construction 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the 
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, [section 504] of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the 
rights of children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a 
civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available un-
der this subchapter, the procedures under [IDEA] shall be exhausted 
to the same extent as would be required had the action been brought 
under this subchapter.229 
Congress enacted this provision in 1986 to overrule Smith v. Robinson,230 
in which the Supreme Court held that the statute that is now IDEA preempted 
remedies under section 504 for denial of free, appropriate public education for 
children with disabilities. The Smith Court did not deny that section 504 re-
quires school districts receiving federal money to provide a free, appropriate 
public education. It was willing to assume “that the reach of § 504 is coexten-
sive with that of the [IDEA].”231 But it found that the remedies of the special 
education law supplanted any available under section 504 in the context of 
special education.232 Like Monahan, Smith sought to harmonize IDEA and sec-
tion 504 by saying that a section 504 claim could not proceed unless it alleged 
something more than the denial of free, appropriate public education. 
The Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986 (“HCPA”)233 restored 
the availability of section 504 remedies for violations of that statute that are 
also violations of IDEA,234 though it made the remedies subject to administra-
tive exhaustion when the relief being sought is available under IDEA. The 
purpose and result was to overrule Smith and restore the section 504-IDEA 
                                                                                                                           
 229 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2012). 
 230 468 U.S. 992, 1019 (1984). By the time it reached the Court, Smith was an appeal regarding 
attorneys’ fees, with the plaintiffs relying on constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a sec-
tion 504 claim, which had been pled but not decided, to support their petition; the federal special edu-
cation statute did not have a fees provision at the time whereas section 504 and § 1983 did. Id. at 994–
95. 
 231 Id. at 1018–19. 
 232 Id. at 1020–21. The Court noted in Smith that courts interpreting the law that is now IDEA had 
ruled that the statute permitted damages only under exceptional circumstances. Id. at 1020 n.24. 
 233 Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796. 
 234 The statute aimed to overrule Smith and bring back all rights that parents and children lost by 
the decision. See Handicapped Children’s Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 1523 Before the Sub-
comm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 99th Cong. 7–8 (statement of Rep. Pat 
Williams, Chairman of the Subcomm. on Select Educ.); 132 CONG. REC. 16,823 (1986) (statement of 
Sen. Weicker) (“The handicapped children of this country have paid the costs for two years now. But 
today we correct this error. In adopting this legislation, we are rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court in Smith v. Robinson, and reaffirming the original intent of Congress . . . .”). 
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overlap. The extent of the harmonization permitted is merely the imposition of 
the exhaustion requirement in cases where the relief asked for is the same. 
More than twenty years ago, in Howell ex rel. Howell v. Waterford Public 
Schools, a district court was asked to follow Monahan and dismiss a section 
504 claim.235 The court recognized that the HCPA overruled Monahan and re-
sponded: 
[D]efendants’ reliance on Monahan is misplaced. The language from 
Monahan . . . (language which, incidentally, was dicta) is similar to 
the following, taken from Smith v. Robinson: “Even assuming that 
the reach of § 504 is co-extensive with that of the [IDEA], there is 
no doubt that the remedies [and] rights . . . set out in the [IDEA] are 
the ones it intended to apply to a handicapped child’s claim to a free 
appropriate public education.” As cases have subsequently observed, 
however, Smith is no longer good law.236 
The Howell court quoted extensively from a Second Circuit opinion in-
terpreting the language that is now in § 1415(l), then codified in § 1415(f): 
By enacting this nonexclusivity provision Congress expressly over-
ruled Smith. Congress stated that § 1415(f) was designed to 
“reestablish statutory rights repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
Smith v. Robinson” and to “reaffirm, in light of this decision, the vi-
ability of section 504, 42 U.S.C. 1983, and other statutes as separate 
vehicles for ensuring the rights of handicapped children.”237 
The court’s quotation of the Second Circuit opinion continued: 
Congress stressed that its original aim had been to allow resort to 
other judicial remedies for claims based on [IDEA]. See 1985 
House Report, supra, at 7; 1986 Senate Report, supra, at 15; see al-
so Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1985: Hearings on 
S.415 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 
(1985) (opening statement of Senator Weicker) (Section 1415(f) “is 
intended to be a simple restoration and clarification of congressional 
intent.”) Moreover, Congress specifically identified § 1983, § 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Constitution as other sources 
                                                                                                                           
 235 Howell ex rel. Howell v. Waterford Pub. Schs., 731 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D. Mich. 1990). The 
plaintiff alleged that the public schools provided him physical and occupational therapy that was inad-
equate as to amount and manner, in violation of the law that is now IDEA and section 504; his section 
504 claim for injunctive relief and damages survived defendant’s motion to dismiss. Id. at 1315. 
 236 Id. at 1317–18 (citations omitted). 
 237 Id. at 1318 (quoting Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748, 754–55 (2d Cir. 1987) (citations omit-
ted)). 
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of rights and remedies in special education cases. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1415(f) [now § 1415(l)]; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 687, 99th Cong., & 
Admin. News 1807, 1809.238 
The post-HCPA cases relying on Monahan ignore 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) 
and its legislative abrogation of Smith and cases that mimic Smith’s reasoning. 
It is as though the courts are trying to overrule the legislative overruling of 
Smith. 
As Howell exemplifies, not every court considering claims for monetary 
relief for reasonable modification and other section 504-ADA violations in the 
area of K–12 education has been misled by Monahan. In one instance, a court 
granted a motion for partial summary judgment on liability in favor of a stu-
dent with autism on a section 504 and ADA claim alleging inadequacy of spe-
cial education services when the services had been found not to meet IDEA’s 
appropriate education standard.239 The court found that failure to make a rea-
sonable modification of a behavioral intervention plan excluded the child from 
participation in school or denied the child educational benefits.240 The court 
specifically rejected imposing any requirement of bad faith, gross misjudg-
ment, or intentional discrimination.241 It found a violation of section 504 from 
the simple failure to provide the accommodation of a behavior plan adapted to 
the child’s needs.242 In another case, a court denied a motion to dismiss section 
504 and ADA claims brought on behalf of a child with multiple disabilities 
who had been deprived of appropriate education over several school years by 
the provision of ineffective services.243 The court rejected an argument that the 
student “cannot receive both an IDEA remedy and a 504 remedy for the same 
denial of” appropriate education, relying on the plain language of § 1415(l), 
and declared, “Plaintiffs need not allege any new facts aside from those previ-
ously litigated in the IDEA administrative proceedings to establish a violation 
of section 504, as long as those facts state a prima facie case.”244 The court 
specifically said that the student need not show intentional discrimination.245 
                                                                                                                           
 238 Id. (quoting Mrs. W., 832 F.2d at 754–55). 
 239 Ind. Area Sch. Dist. v. H.H., 428 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364 (W.D. Pa. 2006). 
 240 Id. 
 241 Id. at 363 n.3. 
 242 Id. at 364. The court reserved judgment on whether the damages remedy that was sought 
would be available under the facts of the case. Id. at 365. On the propriety of compensatory damages 
in cases such as H.H., see infra text accompanying notes 248–261. 
 243 J.L. ex rel. J.L. v. Ambridge Area Sch. Dist., 622 F. Supp. 2d 257, 275 (W.D. Pa. 2008). 
 244 Id. at 274. 
 245 Id. at 275; see also Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 934 (“Congress has clearly expressed its intent that 
remedies be available under [section 504] for acts that also violate the IDEA, overriding the holding 
of the Supreme Court in Smith v. Robinson.”); Pollack v. Regional Sch. Unit 75, 12 F. Supp. 3d 173, 
186, 193–94 (D. Me. 2014) (in case of nonverbal teen with autism and other conditions whose parents 
alleged he had been subject to abuse at school and requested he be permitted to wear recording device, 
ruling that IDEA does not preempt ADA and section 504 claim for failure to make reasonable modifi-
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C. Avoiding Nonexistent Conflicts with Remedial Limits on the Individuals 
with Disabilities Education Act 
The Title VI and Title IX analogy, as applied to education cases, and the 
living-dead Monahan precedent are but two manifestations of the judicial urge 
to restrict special education law to one sphere and disability discrimination law 
to another. One court remarked: 
While Section 504 can be used as the basis for a cause of action in 
many contexts, it has taken on a unique meaning in the special edu-
cation context when a plaintiff’s claim is based on an alleged failure 
to accommodate. See, e.g., Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 
1171 (8th Cir. 1982) (analyzing the standard under which § 504 spe-
cial education claims must be brought by comparing § 504 to the 
IDEA); Doe v. Arlington Cnty. Sch. Bd., 41 F.Supp.2d 599, 608 
(E.D. Va. 1999) (“In the special education context, the standard of 
proving a § 504 claim is extraordinarily high.”) (emphasis added) 
. . . .246 
The court concluded: 
Much of that difference in treatment appears to come from the exist-
ence of IDEA. These courts have consistently held that it is harder 
for a plaintiff to prevail on a failure-to-accommodate claim under 
§ 504 than a failure-to-accommodate claim under IDEA, assuming 
that the plaintiff is covered under both § 504 and IDEA.247 
The flaw in this analysis is that Congress did not write the legislation that 
way. There is no hint in section 504 or the ADA that reasonable accommoda-
tion claims are to be treated differently in elementary and secondary education 
cases, and the only relevant proviso in IDEA is merely that the claims are sub-
ject to an exhaustion requirement in some circumstances. 
When Congress speaks directly to the issue at hand, the debate should be 
over. As a matter of policy, however, is it wise to have a section 504-ADA 
remedy that includes all forms of relief, including damages for emotional dis-
tress and pain and suffering, coexist with an IDEA remedy that the consensus 
of courts restricts to non-damages relief, permitting tuition reimbursement but 
                                                                                                                           
cations; denying motion to dismiss ADA and section 504 reasonable modification claims despite hear-
ing officer denial of IDEA claim); cf. K.M., 725 F.3d at 1102 (upholding claim for accommodation 
under Title II access to communications regulation despite dismissal of identical claim under IDEA), 
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1493 (2014). 
 246 H. v. Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Educ., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1262 (M.D. Ala. 2011). 
 247 Id. 
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no other monetary awards?248 Should “something more” be required in order to 
obtain damages when both statutory provisions apply?249 
Requiring “something more” would make sense only when there is a pol-
icy justification to withhold damages for failure to provide reasonable modifi-
cations. One such instance would be where there is in fact no denial of reason-
able modifications—where a lesser accommodation offered by the defendant is 
reasonable, or where the plaintiff is demanding a fundamental alteration rather 
than a reasonable modification. Taking an example from the non-educational 
context, in the case where the student whose parent was blind could not com-
plete her supervised driving hours, the court described the limited guardianship 
solution offered by the defendant as “eminently reasonable.”250 If the court of 
appeals was correct, there was no violation of the reasonable accommodation 
requirement at all, and no need to demand some special showing beyond denial 
of reasonable accommodation. 
Other cases in which damages would not be appropriate would be those in 
which the alleged emotional distress that is the basis of the damages claim is 
not severe,251 or the causal connection between the failure to accommodate and 
the distress is too attenuated.252 The claim in Monahan itself, for example, is 
difficult to interpret as one for reasonable accommodation, but if it somehow 
were characterized that way, damages for emotional distress would not appear 
to be an appropriate remedy for the past operation of a faulty administrative 
                                                                                                                           
 248 Smith stated, “There is some confusion among the Circuits as to the availability of a damages 
remedy under § 504 and under [IDEA]. Without expressing an opinion on the matter, we note that 
courts generally agree that damages are available under § 504, but are available under [IDEA] only in 
exceptional circumstances.” 468 US. at 1020 n.24. The consensus has not changed, although the Su-
preme Court has never resolved the issue concerning IDEA, apart from approving tuition reimburse-
ment awards under the statute. See, e.g., Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 233 (2009). 
 249 Proponents of this argument would be conceding that some monetary relief, specifically tui-
tion reimbursement, would apply in cases of unintentional discrimination that violate section 504 and 
Title II of the ADA, and to that extent would be rejecting the Guardians Ass’n-Title VI-Title IX anal-
ogy. 
 250 Barber, 562 F.3d at 1230. 
 251 Under typical approaches to compensation for emotional injuries, the distress must be severe 
at least in the absence of physical impact. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 308, at 836 (2000). 
The Supreme Court has disapproved damages based on the abstract value of a right, as well as pre-
sumed or general damages, even for constitutional violations. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 
477 U.S. 299, 309–11 (1986). 
 252 The usual proximate cause tests apply in section 504 and ADA cases. See Cheryl L. Anderson, 
What Is “Because of the Disability” Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accom-
modation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 323, 378–82 (2006) 
(concluding that ordinary approaches to causation should be applied in reasonable accommodation 
cases). The case involving the scooter that tipped over at the zoo might have failed on the ground of a 
lack of proximate causation between the accessibility violation and the accident. See Meagley, 639 
F.3d at 384 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 192–196). 
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appeals procedure.253 Other traditional damages rules, such as the general rule 
that the proper remedy for nonpayment of money excludes consequential dam-
ages and emotional distress,254 may also bar damages in section 504 and ADA 
cases. Similarly, damages premised on a prediction of future disadvantage 
would be excluded if the prediction is speculative or unsupported.255 In fact, in 
many cases where the IDEA and section 504-ADA claims overlap, the reme-
dies available under IDEA—tuition reimbursement, compensatory services, 
and prospective relief—may well be adequate to repair whatever wrong has 
been done.256 
But the default rule should be precisely as it is in non-education reasona-
ble modification cases such as Barnes v. Gorman.257 Compensatory damages 
are available when reasonable accommodations have been denied, the remedy 
is not otherwise forbidden by Congress, and there is no better remedy to re-
store injured parties to their rightful position.258 For example, a claim for dam-
ages should be sustained in the case of a student with profound hearing loss 
who experienced continual headaches and exhaustion in high school for most 
of her freshman year and in some upper-level courses as she struggled to un-
derstand what was going on in class, before the school was finally ordered to 
provide real-time captioning services.259 Evidence in that case supported a 
                                                                                                                           
 253 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 263–64 (1978) (noting that emotional distress is rarely 
caused by deprivation of procedural due process alone). 
 254 DOBBS, supra note 188, § 12.4(1), at 776–77. 
 255 Id. § 3.4, at 234 (“Consequential damages must be proved with reasonable certainty.”). 
 256 A court that upheld a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of IDEA made a similar 
point regarding remedial restraint where non-damages remedies suffice: “We caution that in fashion-
ing a remedy for an IDEA violation, a district court may wish to order educational services, such as 
compensatory education beyond a child’s age of eligibility, or reimbursement for providing at private 
expense what should have been offered by the school, rather than compensatory damages for general-
ized pain and suffering.” W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 495 (3d Cir. 1995), abrogated, A.W. v. Jersey 
City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791 (3d Cir. 2007). If Congress were to clarify matters in future legislation, 
it might want to conform Title II more closely to Title I by spelling out that limited monetary reme-
dies would be available in all accommodations cases, but that an affirmative defense would exist for 
emotional distress damages when the defendant has undertaken in good faith and in cooperation with 
the claimant to make a reasonable modification. See supra text accompanying notes 74–77 (describing 
Title I remedy and affirmative defense in accommodations cases). 
 257 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002). See generally supra text accompanying notes 181–188 (discussing 
Barnes). 
 258 See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (“Moreover, where federally protected rights have 
been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies 
so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, 
and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any 
available remedy to make good the wrong done.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(“The question then, is . . . whether compensatory relief is ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindica-
tion of the interest asserted.”). 
 259 Poway, No. 10CV897, 2014 WL 129086, at *3–4. The claim for damages also covered classes 
after freshman year where the services were not provided. Id. at *5. 
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finding that the substitute accommodations offered failed to provide her with 
communications as effective as those with nondisabled students, as required by 
the ADA, and she experienced tangible suffering as a result.260 She had gradu-
ated by the time the case was decided, so a damages award was the only ap-
propriate remedy.261 
CONCLUSION 
This article submits that the imposition of intent requirements in section 
504 and ADA Title II cases, particularly those requesting monetary relief, is 
the consequence of insufficient attention to Alexander v. Choate, Alexander v. 
Sandoval, Barnes v. Gorman, statutory text and legislative history, and the pol-
icy considerations that ought to determine the scope of liability and relief. In-
tent will be required for some claims, and damages will not always be the 
proper remedy in cases where intent is not shown, but courts must engage in 
the hard task of determining whether reasonable accommodations have been 
denied and what relief is appropriate, rather than reflexively dismissing cases 
for lack of proof of intent. 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See id. at *7 (nevertheless denying student’s motion for summary judgment on liability on 
ground that issues of fact existed). 
 261 See id. at *5. Similarly, when a child with an emotional disturbance was forcibly restrained 
and removed from school when she overreacted to another student physically threatening her, the 
court properly upheld an ADA damages claim despite dismissing claims for constitutional violations 
and an intentional tort. See O.F. v. Chester Upland Sch. Dist., No. 00-779, 2000 WL 424276, at *3 
(E.D. Pa. Apr. 19, 2000) (“For now, the assertion that Plaintiff was excluded from services as a result 
of her disability is sufficient to allow the ADA claim to survive dismissal.”). The cases described 
above in which courts have insisted on intent but allowed damages claims to proceed would of course 
also be strong candidates for damages relief if no intent requirement were imposed. See supra note 
204 (collecting cases). So also would be some cases regarding similar injuries that were rejected on 
the ground that intent was not proven. For an additional discussion of the ADA-section 504 remedies 
issue in elementary and secondary education cases, see Weber, Procedures and Remedies, supra note 
24, at 642–46. 
